Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science

Gallagher, Shaun; Schmicking, Daniel A.

doi:10.1007/978-90-481-2646-0

Cited by 46 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 326 publications

(431 reference statements)

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“…Tellingly, to merely use an object for some discrete period of time is not sufficient for it to become a part of the proprioceptive sensing of an organism. 17 That is to say, there is a crucial distinction between using an artifact, becoming habituated to using an artifact, and having become habituated to using it to the point of incorporating it into one's experience of one's body itself. 18 Seen in this light, longterm ventilator use is not ultimately a question of becoming habituated to the use of a ventilator, but instead of bodily incorporation of the ventilator.…”

Section: The Background Of Pvr Debatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Against Personal Ventilator Reallocation

Reynolds¹,

Guidry‐Grimes²,

Savin³

2020

Camb Q Healthc Ethics

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The COVID-19 (Coronavirus disease of 2019) pandemic has led to intense conversations about ventilator allocation and reallocation during a crisis standard of care. Multiple voices in the media and multiple state guidelines mention reallocation as a possibility. Drawing upon a range of neuroscientific, phenomenological, ethical, and sociopolitical considerations, the authors argue that taking away someone’s personal ventilator is a direct assault on their bodily and social integrity. They conclude that personal ventilators should not be part of reallocation pools and that triage protocols should be immediately clarified to explicitly state that personal ventilators will be protected in all cases.

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Section: The Background Of Pvr Debatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Against Personal Ventilator Reallocation

Reynolds¹,

Guidry‐Grimes²,

Savin³

2020

Camb Q Healthc Ethics

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“…But crucially, although the "phenomenal structure" (of spatial experience or otherwise) is characterized in a way that makes it amenable to an IIT-analysis, the subjective structure itself is never defined rigorously. Alternative examples might be (38,39) and other mathematical attempts to formalize phenomenology (40)(41)(42). One exception in the IIT-literature might be the work from Tsuchiya's lab that tries to relate IIT's informational structures with phenomenology in terms of category theory (43).…”

Section: The Primacy and Structure Of Experiencementioning

confidence: 99%

We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic

Signorelli¹,

Cea²,

Prentner³

2022

Preprint

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Models of consciousness need to explain both objective correlates of conscious experience as well as its subjective structure. However, such an explanation would not need to entail a reduction exclusively in terms of physical or neural systems. We briefly sketch a few points of contention with recent work on integrated information theory and some common assumptions made in the neuroscience of consciousness more generally.

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“…This perspective has regained prominence with the revival of phenomenological psychopathology over the last couple of decades [11,12,13,14,15,16,17]. Such approaches assert that understanding the subjective experience of various forms of psychopathology is necessary for grasping the crucial features of a disorder and for conceptualizing how these may relate to underlying structures and processes or encompassing forms of experience.…”

Section: Contributions Of Phenomenological Psychopathologymentioning

confidence: 99%