2019
DOI: 10.14736/kyb-2019-4-0618
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Handling a Kullback--Leibler divergence random walk for scheduling effective patrol strategies in Stackelberg security games

Abstract: Institute of Mathematics of the Czech Academy of Sciences provides access to digitized documents strictly for personal use. Each copy of any part of this document must contain these Terms of use.

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Cited by 5 publications
(2 citation statements)
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References 36 publications
(46 reference statements)
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“…The temporal component affects the evolution of the game simply because the strategies are periodically recomputed, each time considering a static representation of the scenario. In [101], the authors propose a new model for computing effective patrol strategies in Stackelberg games, showing its efficacy on a naval simulation. It leverages the extraproximal method [102] and its extension to Markov chains, within which the unique Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium of the game is explicitly computed.…”
Section: Solving Approach Papersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The temporal component affects the evolution of the game simply because the strategies are periodically recomputed, each time considering a static representation of the scenario. In [101], the authors propose a new model for computing effective patrol strategies in Stackelberg games, showing its efficacy on a naval simulation. It leverages the extraproximal method [102] and its extension to Markov chains, within which the unique Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium of the game is explicitly computed.…”
Section: Solving Approach Papersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Albarran and Clempner developed a solution for Stackelberg security games based in partially observable Markov games. Solis et al presented a model for computing optimal randomized security policies in Stackelberg security games for multiple players handling a Kullback‐Leibler divergence random walk for scheduling the patrol strategies.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%