Hard times and regime failure: autocratic responses to economic downturns

Tanneberg, Dag; Stefes, Christoph H.; Merkel, Wolfgang

doi:10.1080/13569775.2013.773206

Cited by 44 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…3 Based on the classical definition of Weber (1978), a regime is empirically legitimate if people believe it to be so (Beetham 1991, p. 9, Lipset andLarkin 2004, p. 210). As Merkel et al (2013) and Tanneberg et al (2013) note, this belief can originate from a variety of sources and stretch along a plurality of dimensions. Drawing upon Easton's (1965) differentiation between 'diffuse' and 'specific' support, they argue that the second form of support is connected to the performance and output of the political system.…”

Section: Output Legitimacy and The Performance Dilemma In Authoritarimentioning

confidence: 93%

Performance and persistence of autocracies in comparison: introducing issues and perspectives

Croissant

Wurster

2013

Contemporary Politics

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Authoritarianism research has evolved into one of the fastest growing areas in comparative politics and political economy. However, the newly awakened interest in autocratic regimes goes hand in hand with a lack of systematic research on the results of the political and substantive policy performance of variants of autocratic regimes. In this article we introduce the individual contributions to this special issue and summarize their findings with regard to three core research questions: What are the differences between autocracies and democracies, as well as between different forms of authoritarian regimes, with regard to their outcome performance in selected policy fields? Does policy performance matter for the persistence of authoritarian rule? How can we conceptualize different types of autocratic regimes and do differences in the availability of performance data matter for the results of empirical studies comparing democracies and autocracies or different types of non-democratic regimes?

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Section: Output Legitimacy and The Performance Dilemma In Authoritarimentioning

confidence: 93%

Performance and persistence of autocracies in comparison: introducing issues and perspectives

Croissant

Wurster

2013

Contemporary Politics

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“…В режимах, определяемых как «электоральный авторитаризм», выборы лишь частично выполняют функции сигнальной системы, предупреждающей о непопулярности политического курса или политиков / партий. В таком режиме инкумбенты прибегают к разнообразным инструментам снижения неопределенности: репрессиям, цензуре, фальсификациям [Schedler, 2013] и кооптации [Tanneberg, Stefes, Merkel, 2013;Reuter, Robertson, 2013]. Однако вопрос об эффективности этих инструментов для переатрибуции ответственности за кризис остается открытым, равно как и сами механизмы атрибуции на индивидуальном и групповом уровнях.…”

Section: специфика атрибуции ответственности в россииunclassified

Как И Зачем Измерять И Сравнивать Государственную Состоятельность Разных Стран Мира? Теоретико-Методологические Основания

2019

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В данной статье рассматриваются теоретико-методологические основания концепта государственной состоятельности, под которой понимается способность государства выбирать и эффективно реализовывать собственные решения, в том числе касающиеся внутренней и внешней политики. Авторы подчеркивают, что одной из отличительных особенностей концепта является его многомерность, что приводит их к идее рассмотрения государственной состоятельности как многосоставного явления, комплекса взаимосвязанных способностей (“состоятельностей”), которыми обладает современное государство. В соответствии с данным предположением авторы останавливаются на трех основных измерениях государственной состоятельности: военно-принуждающей (обеспечение внешней безопасности и внутреннего порядка), экстрактивной (доступные в распоряжении государства финансовые ресурсы) и административно-бюрократической (качество административных и бюрократических институтов) способностях государства. Выбор измерений опирался прежде всего на идею наличия у любого современного государства ключевых (“зонтичных”) функций, которые, в свою очередь, могут послужить критерием для проведения сравнительных исследований. При переходе к операционализации подчеркивается особая важность соблюдения баланса между “максималистским” и “минималистским” подходами к отбору показателей. В рамках работы приводится обоснование использования набора индикаторов государственной состоятельности (для принуждающей способности – данные по военным расходам и агрегированный показатель контроля над насилием; для экстрактивной способности – собираемость подоходных налогов и совокупные доходы государственного бюджета, оба – в процентах к ВВП; для административно-бюрократической способности – агрегированный показатель качества управленческих институтов и уровень теневой экономики), который послужит основой для проведения эмпирического исследования и выделения характерных для отдельных групп стран устойчивых структур государственной состоятельности.

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“…Economic downturns usually demonstrate a ruler's incompetence and make him/her more vulnerable (Guriev and Treisman 2015). Existing research argues that "soft" repressions (in contrast to either cooptation or "hard" repressions) are more effective means for preserving autocratic rule during times of economic crisis (Tanneberg, Stefes, and Merkel 2013). This conclusion may find support, as well, if one examines the actual policy decisions of the "King of the Mountain" when facing economic troubles.…”

Section: A Melville and M Mironyukmentioning

confidence: 99%

“Bad enough governance”: state capacity and quality of institutions in post-Soviet autocracies

Melville

Mironyuk

2015

Post-Soviet Affairs

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This article contributes to current discussions on state capacity, quality of institutions, and political regimes. Our analysis demonstrates that the J-curve argument ("good institutions" in autocracies as compared to hybrid and transitional regimes) may not be generic and is not well supported by empirical evidence from the sample of post-Soviet countries. An explanatory model of the "King of the Mountain" is instead provided. Its focus is on the monopoly of political rent as a precondition for extraction of economic rent. It demonstrates an inverse correlation between the quality of institutions and the extraction of political and economic rent, and explains why an autocrat may not have an incentive to improve institutions that may make his/her monopoly vulnerable, and rather would prefer to preserve a low quality of institutions and "bad enough governance." An analysis of a variety of external and domestic factors that may endanger this monopoly is provided. Finally, the autocrat's alternative strategic choices are analyzed. It is argued that better payoffs for the autocrat -paradoxically -may result from partial reforms and improvement of the quality of institutions. However, for various reasons, this is not occurring in post-Soviet autocracies.protection, unemployment insurance, asset redistribution, and fostering markets. Another approach is that of Bäck and Hadenius (2008), who consider stateness as the capacity of state entities to maintain sovereignty. A more detailed focus is taken by Hendrix (2010) via defining state capacity in terms of military capacity, bureaucratic or administrative capacity, and the quality and coherence of political institutions. An institutional approach is found in Fortin (2010), with state capacity measured by five indicators -corruption, contract-intensive money, infrastructure reform, protection of property rights, and tax revenue. Another understanding of state capacity is presented by Lapuente (2010, 2011), who equate state capacity with the quality of government (as assessed by such measures as the International Country Risk Guide and the Worldwide Governance Indicators [WGI]). Thompson (2014) considers state capacity as "state strength," which is measured by indicators reflecting state fiscal capacity (income tax revenue as a proportion of gross domestic product), state coercive capacity (coercive capacity scale), legitimacy ("voice and accountability," "government effectiveness," "rule of law," and "control of corruption [WGI]) and armed force monopoly ("political stability" [WGI]).There are also different approaches to the problem of the relationship among state capacity, quality of institutions, and political regimes. For example, Tilly (2007) provides a theoretical typology of "crude regime types" along two axes (state capacity and democracy): high-capacity/undemocratic (e.g., Kazakhstan); low-capacity/undemocratic (e.g., Somalia); high-capacity/democratic (e.g., Norway) and low-capacity/democratic (e.g., Jamaica). Rose and Shin (2001), Bratton (2004), Bratton and ...

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Hard times and regime failure: autocratic responses to economic downturns

Cited by 44 publications

References 52 publications

Performance and persistence of autocracies in comparison: introducing issues and perspectives

Performance and persistence of autocracies in comparison: introducing issues and perspectives

Как И Зачем Измерять И Сравнивать Государственную Состоятельность Разных Стран Мира? Теоретико-Методологические Основания

“Bad enough governance”: state capacity and quality of institutions in post-Soviet autocracies

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