Hardware/software co-verification of cryptographic algorithms using Cryptol

Erkök, Levent; Carlsson, Magnus; Wick, Adam

doi:10.1109/fmcad.2009.5351121

Cited by 14 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…[27] presents an application of the ESC/Java2 static verifier to check conformance of JavaCard applications to protocol models. [22] describes verification of cryptographic primitives implemented in a functional language Cryptol. CertiCrypt [7] is a framework for writing machine-checked cryptographic proofs.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extracting and verifying cryptographic models from C protocol code by symbolic execution

Aizatulin

Gordon

Jürjens

2011

Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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Consider the problem of verifying security properties of a cryptographic protocol coded in C. We propose an automatic solution that needs neither a pre-existing protocol description nor manual annotation of source code. First, symbolically execute the C program to obtain symbolic descriptions for the network messages sent by the protocol. Second, apply algebraic rewriting to obtain a process calculus description. Third, run an existing protocol analyser (ProVerif) to prove security properties or find attacks. We formalise our algorithm and appeal to existing results for ProVerif to establish computational soundness under suitable circumstances. We analyse only a single execution path, so our results are limited to protocols with no significant branching. The results in this paper provide the first computationally sound verification of weak secrecy and authentication for (single execution paths of) C code.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extracting and verifying cryptographic models from C protocol code by symbolic execution

Aizatulin

Gordon

Jürjens

2011

Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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“…• Finally, SAW provides SAWScript, a scripting language for the tools that allows experts to programmatically generate formal models from code, import formal models from AIG files or Cryptol [3] specifications, do sound compositional verification, and run verification tools.…”

Section: Software Analysis Workbenchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Saw

Carter

Foltzer

Hendrix

et al. 2013

Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGAda Annual Conference on High Integrity Language Technology

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Galois has developed a suite of symbolic simulation and formal analysis tools, collectively called the Software Analysis Workbench (SAW). SAW provides security analysts and engineers with the ability to generate formal models from C and Java programs and prove properties of those programs using several automated verification tools. SAW is primarily used to verify the correctness of cryptographic implementations, and is able to import specifications written in Cryptol, a language developed by Galois for specifying cryptographic primitives.In this short paper, we describe the main components of SAW. We then given an overview of the cryptographic implementations that have been verified.

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“…Decimal numbers may assume any of a variety of types in Cryptol; that is, they are polymorphic. For example, 19 could have the unbounded type Integer (see section 1.4), type [8], type [5], or any other word type with at least 5 bits.…”

Section: B11111011110mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Exercise 1.8. Try out the following sequences: [1,2] [ [1,2,3], [4,5,6], [7,8,9]] Note how the latter example can be used as the representation of a 3 × 3 matrix.…”

Section: Sequences: Homogeneous Collectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%