Harmless Discrimination

Slavny, Adam; Parr, Tom

doi:10.1017/s1352325215000130

Cited by 22 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…See Hellman (2008) and Scanlon (2008). 29 For this case, see Slavny and Parr (2015). See also Alexander (1992).…”

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confidence: 99%

Distributions and Relations: A Hybrid Account

Moles¹,

Parr

2018

Political Studies

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There is a deep divide among political philosophers of an egalitarian stripe. On the one hand, there are so-called distributive egalitarians, who hold that equality obtains within a political community when each of its members enjoys an equal share of the community’s resources. On the other hand, there are so-called social egalitarians, who instead hold that equality obtains within a political community when each of its members stands in certain relations to other members of the community, such as non-domination and lack of oppression. In this article, we have three aims. Our first aim is to cast doubt on the helpfulness of characterizing the debate in this way. Our second aim is to reconstruct this debate in alternative and more precise terms, so that disagreements between advocates of either side are easier to evaluate. Our third aim is to advance a hybrid account that integrates element from both views.

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“…See Hellman (2008) and Scanlon (2008). 29 For this case, see Slavny and Parr (2015). See also Alexander (1992).…”

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confidence: 99%

Distributions and Relations: A Hybrid Account

Moles¹,

Parr

2018

Political Studies

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“…To illustrate this criticism, let's consider the following two cases (Tadros 2011, ch. 7;Slavny and Parr 2015):…”

Section: The Separation Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is plenty more to say on this debate, but we will not rehearse the arguments here since they are adequately dealt with elsewhere (Tadros 2011, ch. 7;Slavny and Parr 2015;Parr forthcoming).…”

Section: The Buck-passing Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

What’s Wrong with Risk?

Parr

Slavny

2019

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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Imposing pure risks—risks that do not materialise into harm—is sometimes wrong. The Harm Account explains this wrongness by claiming that pure risks are harms. By contrast, The Autonomy Account claims that pure risks impede autonomy. We develop two objections to these influential accounts. The Separation Objection proceeds from the observation that, if it is wrong to v then it is sometimes wrong to risk v‐ing. The intuitive plausibility of this claim does not depend on any account of the facts that ground moral wrongness. This suggests a close relationship between the factors that make an act wrong and the factors that make risking that act wrong, which both accounts fail to recognise. The Determinism Objection holds that both accounts fail to explain the wrongness of pure risks in a deterministic world. We then develop an alternative—The Buck‐Passing Account—that withstands both objections.

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“…See also Miller (1998), 24. 9 See also, Slavny and Parr (2015) for an argument to this effect on the topic of discrimination. impacts people's shares and opportunities (although, social egalitarians agree, it is worse if they do).…”

Section: The Mischaracterization Of Social Egalitarian Concernsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unequally egalitarian? Defending the credentials of social egalitarianism

Axelsen

Bidadanure

2018

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosoph

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In his new book, Luck Egalitarianism, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen responds to challenges raised by social egalitarians against luck egalitarianism. Social egalitarianism is the view according to which a just society is one where people relate to each other as equals, while the basic premise of luck egalitarianism is that it is unfair if people are worse-off than others through no fault or choice of their own. Lippert-Rasmussen argues that the most important objections to luck egalitarianism made by social egalitarians can either be largely accommodated by luck egalitarians or lack the argumentative force that its proponents believe them to have. While Lippert-Rasmussen does offer a version of luck egalitarianism that seems to avoid some of the main lines of criticism, he mischaracterizes parts of both the form and the content of the disagreement, and thus ultimately misses the mark. In this paper, we provide a substantive, a methodological and a political defense of social egalitarianism by elaborating on this mischaracterization. More work must be done, we argue, if social egalitarianism is to be dismissed and its concerns genuinely incorporated in the luck egalitarian framework. Until this is done, the supposed theoretical superiority of luck egalitarianism remains contested.

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Harmless Discrimination

Cited by 22 publications

References 0 publications

Distributions and Relations: A Hybrid Account

Distributions and Relations: A Hybrid Account

What’s Wrong with Risk?

Unequally egalitarian? Defending the credentials of social egalitarianism

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