The European debt crisis marks one of the most fundamental crises the EU has ever faced. Starting in 2009, it became clear that certain member states of the Eurozone (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) had become highly indebted, bringing them to the brink of financial collapse. Due to low economic growth rates, these countries were unable to deleverage on their own, and many creditors feared that the loans the debtor states had borrowed on the capital market would never be repaid. As a consequence, the major bond rating agencies downgraded the credit status of those Eurozone countries, making it even more difficult for them to receive the necessary loans to cover government spending (Gerhards & Lengfeld, 2013). As the national economies in the EMU are tightly intertwined, the risk of adverse cross-country spill-over effects was looming (European Central Bank, 2011). Moreover, the EMU lacks institutional oversight and a common European fiscal policy. Thus, 'a debt default of an EMU country will have catastrophic consequences for their own economies' (Fernandes & Rubio, 2012, p. 20). The collective fate of the Eurozone members ultimately put the EU to its utmost stress test (Marsh, 2013). On one hand, the creditor states blamed the debtor states for failing to collect taxes and spending money beyond their means on pensions and public administration. On the other hand, the debtor states argued that the creditor states profited most from free trade within the