Hayek the Apriorist?

Abstract

The paper argues that Terence Hutchison's ( 1981 ) argument that the young F. A. Hayek maintained a methodological position markedly similar to that of Ludwig von Mises fails to support the relevant conclusion. The fi rst problem with Hutchison's argument is that it is not clear exactly what conclusion he meant to establish. Mises (in)famously maintained a rather extreme methodological apriorism. However, the concept of a priori knowledge that emerges from Hayek's epistemology as implied in his work on theoretical psychology is the opposite of Mises's treatment of a priori knowledge. Thus, it cannot be maintained-if, indeed, Hutchison meant to establish-that Hayek was a Misesian apriorist during the years in question. What's more, the paper shows that Hutchison's argument does not support a weaker interpretation of the relevant conclusion. There are alternative interpretations of Hutchison's evidence, more charitable and more consistent with Hayek's epistemology, which undermine Hutchison's conclusion.

Austrian economics without extreme apriorism: construing the fundamental axiom of praxeology as analytic

“…Consequently, what Hayek thought about praxeology and about Mises’ conception of the a priori is highly controversial. Scheall ( 2015a , b ), although he has “skin in the game”, presents a balanced and insightful overview of the history of the debates regarding Hayek’s epistemological position and his purported turns. Contrary to Hutchison’s still influential received view, Scheall opines that Hayek was a fallibilist throughout his life 22 and concludes that “Hayek and Mises defended mutually inconsistent notions of a priori knowledge such that, even if Hayek had accepted methodological apriorism (a claim he always denied), it would have meant something different to him than it meant to Mises” (Scheall 2015b , p. 42).…”

“… 24 Empirically minded commentators might recognize this limited reach of a priori reasoning as a merit of Hayek’s position. In addition, Hayek’s appraisal of the empirical reach can be reconstructed as equally modest: “[W]hatever knowledge we possess with respect to economic phenomena comes to us via experience and that experience doesn’t furnish a great deal of knowledge with respect to economic phenomena” (Scheall 2015a , p. 101). …”

Viktor J. Vanberg, ed., The Sensory Order and Other Writings on the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology by F. A. Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), pp. 432, $70 (hardcover). ISBN: 9780226436425.

“…Indeed, a case can be made that there is virtually no part of Hayek’s extensive canon that is not to some extent dependent on his theoretical psychology. (Full disclosure: I have in fact made much of this case in print; see Scheall 2015a, 2015b, 2016). This might be said for many reasons, but none other is needed than the fact that these writings contain the bulk of Hayek’s epistemology, and Hayek was, after all, in Walter Weimer’s words (1982, p. 263; quoted in Vanberg’s introduction, p. 26n105), “at all times an epistemologist, especially when doing technical economics, and even in his historical and popular writings.”…”

“…These facts should similarly finish off the claim, again unfortunately long-lived in the literature despite also only ever being clumsily made (Hutchison 1981; Boettke 2015; Zanotti and Cachanosky 2015; cf. Scheall 2017), that there is some affinity between Hayek’s modern empiricist epistemology and von Mises’s pre-modern “almost eighteenth-century rationalism” (Hayek 1978, p. 137; see Scheall 2015a, 2017). The collection of all of Hayek’s writings on theoretical psychology in one place and, especially, the publication of his very first academic writing on this (really, any) topic, previously available only in German and then only since 2006, marks a significant moment in Hayek scholarship.…”

Philosophy of Austrian Economics – Extended Cut

“…More recently,Blaug (1992Blaug ( /2006 concurs by declaring ontological individualism to be "trivially true" but denies any necessary implication for methodology.26 See e.g Caldwell 2009;Linsbichler 2017Linsbichler , 2021cScheall 2015bScheall , 2017aTokumaru 2018;Zanotti & Cachanosky 2015. …”