Hedging and Wedging: Strategies to Contest Russia’s Leadership in Post-Soviet Eurasia

Meister, Stefan

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-73691-4_11

Cited by 13 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 15 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…In reality, Russia's attempts to dominate the region provoked various contestation strategies on the part of the ex-Soviet republics. Multi-vector foreign policies formed the cores of their typical hedging strategies (Meister 2018;Preiherman 2017;Vinokurov 2017).…”

Section: Russian Incentives To Dominate the Post-soviet Regionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most post-Soviet nations improve their bargaining positions through hedging strategies in which Russia has to compete for influence with outside players like the EU, NATO, and China. (Meister 2018;Preiherman 2017;Vinokurov 2017). Since 2014, smaller members of the Eurasian Economic Union have been actively exploring the alternatives of developing relations with external powers (Mukhametdinov 2020).…”

Section: Smaller Members Are Not Bound By the Choice Of The Eaeu Overmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Russia, Post-Soviet Integration, and the EAEU: The Balance between Domination and Cooperation

Бусыгина

Филиппов

2020

Problems of Post-Communism

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Russian leadership promotes a vision of a multipolar world where major powers must have their own "zones of influence." This implies that other "great powers" have to recognize Moscow's sphere of dominance over the post-Soviet realm. It also makes Russia's neighbors increasingly reluctant to delegate their sovereignty to institutions of regional integration, as those are likely to become instruments of Russian domination. As the partners do not trust Russia, they insist on a limited character of integration projects. Russia is more likely to be successful in using asymmetric bilateral bargains rather than multilateral institutions to dominate the post-Soviet region.

show abstract

Section: Russian Incentives To Dominate the Post-soviet Regionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Smaller Members Are Not Bound By the Choice Of The Eaeu Overmentioning

confidence: 99%

Russia, Post-Soviet Integration, and the EAEU: The Balance between Domination and Cooperation

Бусыгина

Филиппов

2020

Problems of Post-Communism

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The last type is a wedging strategy. Whereas the aforementioned hedging strategies look to forge something of a middle ground for the smaller power between the great powers in their regional setting, wedging is a strategy which seeks to drive a wedge between the great powers to improve the terms of the smaller power’s relationships with (ultimately) one of those powers (Meister, 2018). Thus, importantly, wedging is a hedging strategy – unlike dual‐alignment, asymmetrical alignment, or non‐alignment – which looks to maximise relations with one power (the highest bidder) ultimately at the expense of the other.…”

Section: Smaller Power Hedgingmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Hedging Goes Wrong: Lessons from Ukraine’s Failed Hedge of the EU and Russia

Smith

2020

Global Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When confronted by the competing zero‐sum regional strategies of the EU and Russia between 2010 and 2013, Ukraine chose to aggressively pursue a dual‐aligned hedge. This policy choice, in part, helped precipitate a disastrous outcome: the Ukraine crisis. Using the insights of the literature on smaller power hedging and regional security complex theory, it is argued that Viktor Yanukovych misperceived the geopolitical feedback emanating from the Eastern Europe security complex, leading it to pursuing a suboptimal foreign policy. Hedging was still the optimal foreign policy for Ukraine, but arguably a more modest form of hedging was required. It is argued that Ukraine’s experience raises important questions about the actorness of smaller powers to pursue hedging strategies in geopolitically‐charged regional security complexes.

show abstract

“…N. de E.: Optamos por nombrar a este país Belarús, en vez de Bielorrusia, por ser la versión oficial que se adoptó en el momento de su independencia en 1991 y que ha mantenido hasta ahora. estratégica» (strategic hedging), «equilibrio blando» (soft balancing) y «apertura de brechas» (wedging) (Moshes, 2017;Meister, 2018;. No obstante, no se produjo progreso alguno en este sentido.…”

Section: Conclusiónunclassified

“…La apertura de brechas (wedging), por su parte, aprovecha conflictos existentes para aumentar la libertad de acción y mejora la posición de negociación (Gnedina, 2015). Que estas estrategias tengan éxito o no dependerá de varias condiciones, entre las que se encuentran el nivel de rivalidad entre los actores principales, las capacidades y los recursos internos y la proximidad a otros actores externos, así como la capacidad de negociación (Meister, 2018).…”

Section: Teorización Del Comportamiento En Política Exterior De Los Eunclassified

Untitled

2020

rcai

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Los artículos expresan las opiniones de los autores. "Cualquier forma de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública o transformación de esta obra sólo puede ser realizada con la autorización de sus titulares, salvo excepción prevista por la ley. Diríjase a CEDRO (Centro Español de Derechos Reprográficos, www.cedro.org), si necesita fotocopiar o escanear algún fragmento de esta obra".

show abstract

Hedging and Wedging: Strategies to Contest Russia’s Leadership in Post-Soviet Eurasia

Cited by 13 publications

References 15 publications

Russia, Post-Soviet Integration, and the EAEU: The Balance between Domination and Cooperation

Russia, Post-Soviet Integration, and the EAEU: The Balance between Domination and Cooperation

When Hedging Goes Wrong: Lessons from Ukraine’s Failed Hedge of the EU and Russia

Untitled

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About