Hedonic study on mobile telephony market in France: pricing–quality strategies

Karamti, Chiraz; Grzybowski, Lukasz

doi:10.1007/s11066-010-9049-y

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…The hedonic price model is based on the intuition that any product can be viewed as a bundle of attributes such that rms and consumers trade to determine the price attached to each attribute. Rosen (1974) provides a formal presentation of this model in a perfectly competitive framework and Karamti and Grzybowski (2010) applies it to study the evolution of the prices of mobile telephony services in France.…”

Section: The Hedonic Price Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Entry and Merger on the Price of Mobile Telecommunications Services

Houngbonon

2015

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. According to static models of industrial organization, a rise in competition decreases prices. In this paper, I test whether this conclusion can be reversed in the mobile telecommunications markets where dynamic eciency eects might be signicant. The empirical test relies on the change in the intensity of competition introduced by the entry of the fourth mobile operator in France and the merger between the third and the fourth mobile operators in Austria. Using a hedonic price model and a double-dierence matching identication strategy, I nd that the entry in the French market has raised the unit price of mobile data services by 4 dollars per Gigabyte; contrary to the merger in the Austrian market which lowers the unit price of mobile data by 6 dollars per Gigabyte. These results suggest that the dynamic eciency eects actually outweigh the static ones in the mobile telecommunications industry. Therefore, a merger from four to three mobile operators may be welfare enhancing. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Section: The Hedonic Price Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Entry and Merger on the Price of Mobile Telecommunications Services

Houngbonon

2015

SSRN Journal

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“…The MNOs offer increasingly complex and diversified products at lower and lower prices. Besides, changes in quality are reflected by improvements in physical and non-physical characteristics which induce several dimensions in the measurement issue (Karamti and Grzybowski, 2010). Furthermore, even though price differentials may reflect quality differences, most of the studies assume that the mobile service is provided at same quality by each mobile operator in the sample which makes the simple prices comparison irrelevant.…”

Section: Pricesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Privatization, Reforms and Firm’s Performance in Mobile Telecommunication Industry

Karamti¹,

Kammoun²

2011

Recent Developments in Mobile Communications - A Multidisciplinary Approach

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Although there has been much empirical research on the effects of privatization, competition and regulation on the telecommunications sector, very little empirical work was interested in studying these effects on mobile telecommunication sector. This chapter studies the effects of telecommunication reforms (privatization, competition and regulation) on mobile operator's performance in the OCDE area. 2. The dilemma of privatization Many economists, policy makers and corporate managers have long believed that private firms are more efficient than public ones. Privatization, defined as the sale of (total or partial) previously state-owned enterprises to private owners, is, so, assumed to increase the firm's efficiency and profitability because, on the one hand, the change in ownership structure shifts the privatized firm's objectives and the managers' incentives away from those imposed by politicians. The managers are then subordinate to them on monitoring and discipline of profit oriented investors. On the other hand, privatization may very well deter market competition since the incumbent is able to engage in anti-competitive behaviors. The public incumbent, instead, due to political oversight may suffer from inefficient operation in competing with the rivals. As a result, since the late of 1980s, several countries have undergone partial or full privatization of their utility sectors, especially telecommunications. In fact, until recently, in most countries, telecommunications service providers were state owned, state operated, and often monopolistic. The telecommunications sector was viewed as the quintessential public utility. Economies of scale, combined with political sensitivity, created large entry barriers and externalities. Since the 1980s, policy makers gradually began to recognize that telecommunications systems are an essential infrastructure for economic development. As the economy broadens and becomes critically dependent on vastly expanded flows of information, telecommunications acquires strategic importance for economic growth and development. Besides, rapid technological innovations in the past three decades have significantly reduced economies of scale and scope in this sector, attenuating the economic rationale for a state-owned natural monopoly in the Telecommunications sector. The solution was privatization which aims to break the monopoly and improve the efficiency and performance of the telecommunication industry. Theoretically, privatization affects the firm's performance through multiple channels. It might cause firms to operate more productively because managers are subjected to the pressures of the financial markets and to the monitoring and discipline of profit-oriented investors. In addition, the change in ownership structure of privatized firms shifts the firm's objectives and managers' incentives away from those that are imposed on them by politicians, toward those that aim to maximize efficiency, profitability, and shareholders' wealth. By going public, firms would have many entrepr...

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“…Hedonic price regressions were commonly used to study price changes in different industries. There is also a number of empirical studies for telecommunications markets including Karamti and Grzybowski (2010) and Nicolle et al (2018) for mobile prices in France; Greenstein and McDevitt (2011) for broadband industry in the U.S.; Wallsten and Riso (2014) for broadband services in OECD countries; Calzada and Martinez-Santos (2014) for broadband prices in 15 EU countries.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of Roaming Regulation on Revenues and Prices of Mobile Operators in the EU

Grzybowski

Muñoz-Acevedo

2021

SSRN Journal

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Hedonic study on mobile telephony market in France: pricing–quality strategies

Abstract: Mobile telephony, Pricing, Hedonic indexes, Quality-adjustment,

Cited by 10 publications

References 21 publications

The Impact of Entry and Merger on the Price of Mobile Telecommunications Services

The Impact of Entry and Merger on the Price of Mobile Telecommunications Services

Privatization, Reforms and Firm’s Performance in Mobile Telecommunication Industry

Impact of Roaming Regulation on Revenues and Prices of Mobile Operators in the EU

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