Hegel and the ontological argument for the existence of God

Abstract

We reconstruct Hegel's implicit version of the ontological argument in the light of his anti-representationalist idealist metaphysics. For Hegel, the ontological argument had been a peculiarly modern form of argument for the existence of God, presupposing a ‘representationalist’ account of the mind and its concepts. As such, it was susceptible to Kant's famous refutation, but Kant himself had provided a model for an alternative conception of concept, one developed by Fichte with his notion of the I=I. We reconstruct an Hegelian version of the ontological argument by considering the possibility of a Fichtean version, and then subjecting it to a critique based on Hegel's critical appropriation of Fichte's I=I.

Hegel's Ontological Argument: A Reconstruction

“…The rough idea would be that Being, in Hegel's sense, must be. 12 It is not exactly that Being is a real predicate, the copula, or an absolute subject, the three alternatives considered by Kant (though this last is closest to Hegel's meaning). Rather, we are operating at a pre-predicative standpoint.…”

“…So he has not simply overlooked it. 3 In addition to Harrelson, he cites Bubbio and Redding (2014). Oppy does not consider the recent books, in English, by Bubbio (2017) and Williams (2017), for example-and, in German, the earlier work of Henrich (1960) and the more recent book by Melichar (2020).…”

“…3 In addition to Harrelson, he cites Bubbio and Redding (2014). Oppy does not consider the recent books, in English, by Bubbio (2017) and Williams (2017), for example-and, in German, the earlier work of Henrich (1960) and the more recent book by Melichar (2020). 4 I therefore somewhat agree with Inwood when he says that 'The proof is no longer a proof in anything like the traditional sense ' (2018: 121).…”

“…However, the most important difference between my piece and Inwood's is that I persist in trying to put the argument in premise-conclusion form, something which Inwood (perhaps wisely) does not attempt to do. 5 This is perhaps most true of Harrelson (2008), but also to varying extents of Bubbio (2017) and Williams (2017). However, despite dissenting from Harrelson's approach, I consider my account a further development of his in one crucial respect: we both maintain that Hegel runs a Jake McNulty (compelling) ontological argument on definitions of the Absolute from the Doctrine of Being.…”

The Reality of Religion in Hegel’s Idealist Metaphysics

“…For Hegel, God becomes actual only in the thought of human agents—subjective spirits—as a result of human interaction , especially in the recognitive practice of reconciliation that characterizes the religious community (cf. Redding and Bubbio 2014: 482). God’s self-actualisation is not independent of that which determines our relation to God, such as historical, social and cultural dimensions, but these dimensions actually shape God’s self-actualisation.…”