Helpless in Finance: The Cost of Helping Effort Among Bank Employees

Brown, Michelle; Heywood, John S.

doi:10.1007/s12122-009-9063-8

Cited by 28 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…The few existing empirical studies on help mostly employ survey data. For example, Drago and Garvey (1998) and Brown and Heywood (2009) find indications that helping is negatively correlated with individual relative rewards. Kräkel (2005) investigates a two-stage model in which players first decide whether they want to help or sabotage and then choose their efforts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Helping under a combination of team and tournament incentives

Danilov

Harbring

Irlenbusch

2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world's largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Helping under a combination of team and tournament incentives

Danilov

Harbring

Irlenbusch

2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…5 This is an 3 See Drago and Garvey (1998) for a questionnaire study on the effects of promotion incentives on help. See also Brown and Heywood (2009) for a field study on help in settings with individual performance pay and Antonetti and Rufini (2008) for a theoretical analysis of training of low-ability types by high-ability types. 4 For examples, see Zwick and Chen (1999), Brandts and Charness (2003), Weber and Camerer (2003), and Harbring and Irlenbusch (2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stand by Me—Experiments on Help and Commitment in Coordination Games

et al. 2016

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We present experiments studying how high-ability individuals use help to foster efficient coordination. After an initial phase that traps groups in a low-productivity equilibrium, incentives to coordinate are increased, making it possible to escape this performance trap. The design varies whether high-ability individuals can offer help and, if so, whether they must commit to help for an extended period. If help is chosen on a round-by-round basis, the probability of escaping the performance trap is slightly reduced by allowing for help. The likelihood of success significantly improves if high-ability individuals must commit to help for an extended time. We develop and estimate a structural model of sophisticated learning that provides an explanation for why commitment is necessary. The key insight is that potential leaders who are overly optimistic about their ability to teach their followers are too fast to eliminate help in the absence of commitment.Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx

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