Heterogeneous Motives and the Collective Creation of Value.

Bridoux, Flore; Coeurderoy, Régis; Durand, Rodolphe

doi:10.5465/amr.2011.65554704

Cited by 27 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 87 publications

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“…Interorganizational networks become more heterogeneous (Bridoux et al 2011;Felin and Hesterly 2007). Interorganizational networks become more heterogeneous (Bridoux et al 2011;Felin and Hesterly 2007).…”

Section: Interorganizational Pm Research Trendsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Interorganizational Performance Management: A Co‐evolutionary Model

Fenema

Keers

2018

Int J Management Reviews

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Making interorganizational cooperation successful proves a daunting task. While current approaches to interorganizational performance management (PM) highlight why interorganizational cooperation matters and which phases are required, it remains silent on the dynamics of interorganizational PM. That is, how can PM evolve with and contribute to interorganizational cooperation. The purpose of this paper is to increase understanding of interorganizational PM. To this end, it develops a structure and process foundation of interorganizational value creation, and it provides a model that shows how processes of organizational and interorganizational PM co‐evolve. The study starts by providing insight into differences between organizational and interorganizational PM. It then presents five approaches pertaining to performance in interorganizational cooperation. The paper distinguishes strategic–economic, PM, supply‐chain management, organizational and marketing approaches. These approaches are related from a structure and process angle and are used to develop a co‐evolutionary model of interorganizational PM. The resulting conceptualization has implications for research on new modes of complex and heterogeneous interorganizational value creation. The paper elaborates on these implications, pointing to new directions for future PM research.

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Section: Interorganizational Pm Research Trendsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Heterogeneous interorganizational PM. Interorganizational networks become more heterogeneous (Bridoux et al 2011;Felin and Hesterly 2007). In some sectors, initiatives emerge that enhance the heterogeneity of interorganizational cooperation: e.g.…”

Section: Interorganizational Pm Research Trendsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interorganizational Performance Management: A Co‐evolutionary Model

Fenema

Keers

2018

Int J Management Reviews

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“…The assumption that all stakeholders care about fairness is at odds with the findings of social psychologists and behavioral economists (e.g., De Cremer and Van Lange, 2001;Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a). Research in these two fields has demonstrated that motives to cooperate are heterogeneous across individuals and that these motives affect behaviors in collective endeavors such as value creation (Bridoux, Coeurderoy, and Durand, 2011). The empirical evidence suggests that individual stakeholders can be categorized into two main types: self-regarding and reciprocal stakeholders.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Microfoundations for stakeholder theory: Managing stakeholders with heterogeneous motives

Bridoux

Stoelhorst

2013

Strategic Management Journal

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347

315

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“…While we focus in this paper on the effects of transactional integrity on contracting arrangements, we are explicit about heterogeneity in opportunism at the actor level and resulting competitive advantage that may arise as a result of differential contracting frictions. Existing research shows that, even when holding geography and industry constant, there are great differences among market actors in the extent to which they are prone to exploit their business partners (Bridoux, Coeurderoy, and Durand, ; Camerer and Thaler, ; Sliwka, ). This is consistent with transaction cost theory, which, while it focuses on the role of moral hazard in contracting arrangements, does not in fact assert that all parties are opportunistic (Williamson, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Value creation and value capture under moral hazard: Exploring the micro‐foundations of buyer– supplier relationships

Obłój

Zemsky

2014

Strategic Management Journal

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We combine the formalism of a principal–agent framework with a value‐based analysis in order to investigate the micro‐foundations of business partner selection and the division of value in contracting relationships. In particular, we study how the key contracting parameters such as efficiency, transactional integrity, incentive alignment, and gaming affect outcomes when buyers face competing suppliers. We show that integrity and efficiency increase value creation and capture for all parties and are complements. While incentive gaming is unambiguously bad for value creation, and reduces buyers' value capture, it can benefit some suppliers. For alignment, we find that neither party has an incentive to use fully aligned performance measures that maximize total value creation. We conclude by analyzing buyers' and suppliers' incentives to invest in integrity. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Heterogeneous Motives and the Collective Creation of Value.

Cited by 27 publications

References 87 publications

Interorganizational Performance Management: A Co‐evolutionary Model

Interorganizational Performance Management: A Co‐evolutionary Model

Microfoundations for stakeholder theory: Managing stakeholders with heterogeneous motives

Value creation and value capture under moral hazard: Exploring the micro‐foundations of buyer– supplier relationships

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