Heterogenous demand for public goods: Behavior in the voluntary contributions mechanism

Fisher, Joseph G.; Isaac, R. Mark; Schatzberg, Jeffrey W.; Walker, James M.

doi:10.1007/bf01048198

Cited by 146 publications

(98 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…In an early review of experimental work on PGG, Ledyard [109] concluded that asymmetry of benefits had negative effects on contributions. Fisher et al [112] showed that individuals with lower valuation to cost ratios v i /c i contribute less than those with high values of this ratio, as predicted by the theory. Chan et al [113] provided some experimental support for an increase in public good provision with inequality in wealth, again as predicted.…”

Section: (Iv) Experimental Gamesmentioning

confidence: 77%

Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups

Gavrilets

2015

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

118

133

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One contribution of 13 to a theme issue 'Solving the puzzle of collective action through inter-individual differences: evidence from primates and humans'. I review the theoretical and experimental literature on the collective action problem in groups whose members differ in various characteristics affecting individual costs, benefits and preferences in collective actions. I focus on evolutionary models that predict how individual efforts and fitnesses, group efforts and the amount of produced collective goods depend on the group's size and heterogeneity, as well as on the benefit and cost functions and parameters. I consider collective actions that aim to overcome the challenges from nature or win competition with neighbouring groups of co-specifics. I show that the largest contributors towards production of collective goods will typically be group members with the highest stake in it or for whom the effort is least costly, or those who have the largest capability or initial endowment. Under some conditions, such group members end up with smaller net pay-offs than the rest of the group. That is, they effectively behave as altruists. With weak nonlinearity in benefit and cost functions, the group effort typically decreases with group size and increases with within-group heterogeneity. With strong nonlinearity in benefit and cost functions, these patterns are reversed. I discuss the implications of theoretical results for animal behaviour, human origins and psychology.

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Section: (Iv) Experimental Gamesmentioning

confidence: 77%

Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups

Gavrilets

2015

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

118

133

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“…Ostrom et al (1994), van Dijk et al (2002), and Cherry et al (2005 find that inequality leads to lower contributions, Chan et al (1996) and Buckley and Croson (2006) report a positive effect, and Chan et al (1999) and Sadrieh and Verbon (2006) no effect. With respect to heterogeneity in the marginal benefit from the public good, Fisher et al (1995) find that individuals with a high marginal benefit contribute more than those with a low marginal benefit.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 87%

Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Reuben

Riedl

2013

Games and Economic Behavior

280

211

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations AbstractEconomic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous characteristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of different contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and different heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not allowed all groups converge towards free-riding. With punishment, contributions increase and differ distinctly across groups and individuals with different induced characteristics. We show econometrically that these differences are not accidentally but enforced by punishment. The enforced contribution norms are related to fairness ideas of equity regarding the contributions but not regarding the earnings. Individuals with different characteristics tacitly agree on the norm to be enforced, even if this leads to large payoff differences. Our results also emphasize the role of details of the environment that may alter focal contribution norms in an important way.JEL Code: H41, C92, Z13.

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“…7 Previous linear public goods experiments allowing for heterogeneity in the marginal per capita return include Brookshire et al (1993), Fisher et al (1995), Brandts and Schram (2001), and Goeree et al (2002). An experiment investigating the effect of asymmetric preferences in a non-linear environment is provided by Chan et al (1999).…”

Section: The Asymmetric Public Goods Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Are Cooperators Efficiency- or Fair-Minded? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment

et al. 2007

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We use a two-person public goods experiment to distinguish between efficiency and fairness as possible motivations for cooperative behavior. Asymmetric marginal per capita returns allow only the high-productivity player to increase group payoffs when contributing positive amounts. Asymmetric contributions, however, yield unequal individual payoffs. To assess a priori cooperative preferences, we measure individual 'value-orientations' by means of the decomposed game technique. Overall, our results indicate that fairness (or inequality aversion) is more influential than efficiency in driving behavior.

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Heterogenous demand for public goods: Behavior in the voluntary contributions mechanism

Cited by 146 publications

References 9 publications

Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups

Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups

Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Are Cooperators Efficiency- or Fair-Minded? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment

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