Hidden Moving Target Defense against False Data Injection in Distribution Network Reconfiguration

Liu, Bo; Wu, Hongyu; Pahwa, Anil; Ding, Fei; Ibrahim, Erfan; Liu, Ting

doi:10.1109/pesgm.2018.8586470

Cited by 26 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…where the first four items irrelative to the line reactance are consistent with the results in [11]. We can calculate s G x by using (4) and (7)(8)(9)(10) as follows:…”

Section: A Preliminaries In Derivatives In Acopf Modelsupporting

confidence: 83%

An Interior-Point Solver for Optimal Power Flow Problem Considering Distributed FACTS Devices

Liu¹,

Edmonds²,

zhang³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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In this paper, we propose an AC optimal power flow (ACOPF) model considering distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices, in which the reactance of D-FACTS equipped lines are introduced as decision variables. This is motivated by increasing interests in using D-FACTS devices to address system operational and cyber-security concerns. First, D-FACTS devices can be incorporated in real-time operations for economic benefits such as managing power congestions and reducing system losses. Second, D-FACTS devices can be utilized by moving target defense (MTD), an emerging concept against cyber-attacks, to prevent attackers from knowing true system configurations. Therefore, system operators can use the proposed ACOPF model to achieve economic benefits and provide the setpoints of D-FACTS devices for MTD at the same time. In addition, we rigorously derive the gradient and Hessian matrices of the objective function and constraints, which are further used to build an interior-point solver of the proposed ACOPF. Numerical results on the IEEE 118-bus transmission system show the validity of the proposed ACOPF model as well as the efficacy of the interior-point solver in minimizing system losses and generation costs. <br>

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“…where the first four items irrelative to the line reactance are consistent with the results in [11]. We can calculate s G x by using (4) and (7)(8)(9)(10) as follows:…”

Section: A Preliminaries In Derivatives In Acopf Modelsupporting

confidence: 83%

An Interior-Point Solver for Optimal Power Flow Problem Considering Distributed FACTS Devices

Liu¹,

Edmonds²,

zhang³

et al. 2020

Preprint

Self Cite

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“…The modern electric grid is dependent on many cyber-physical systems, such as intelligent electronic devices and advanced metering infrastructure, to enhance systemwide command and control operations, monitor energy usage, and even help support newer DER systems; however, traditionally, electric grid communications used dedicated lines for supervisory control and data acquisition system communications, but modernization efforts and the adoption of DERs have started seeing the use of the Internet as a resilient, distributed, and cost-effective open alternative (Saleem et al 2020a;de Carvalho and Saleem 2019). The grid is evolving rapidly and developing a defense mechanism for an open alternative is a moving target that is challenging and difficult (Liu et al 2018).…”

Section: Motivation For Developing Module-otmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modular Security Apparatus for Managing Distributed Cryptography for Command-and-Control Messages on Operational Technology Networks (Module-OT)

Saleem

Granda

Touhiduzzaman

et al. 2022

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Modern energy systems are characterized by a shift toward diverse and distributed technologies-a blend of new and legacy energy resources interconnected by data and control networks. Increased interconnectivity improves communications and flexibility on the electric power system, but its effect on cybersecurity can pose challenges. More connections can create more options for cyberattacks, and many cybersecurity standards for devices are either outdated, unenforced, or simply nonexistent for some legacy devices. Such circumstances can leave energy systems unprotected, and a successful cyberattack on even one device-e.g., a photovoltaic (PV) inverter, electric vehicle charger, or an energy storage device-could potentially propagate to other connection points across a utility's network. As the electric power industry continues to adapt standards to include modern cybersecurity practices, the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response awarded funding to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) to develop a solution that protects distributed energy resources (DERs) and to advance the state of the art for modern cybersecurity. The project partners include the Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) and Yaskawa Solectria Solar (Solectria).This report describes a demonstrated solution to improve the overall cybersecurity posture of legacy and future DER systems without disrupting the existing infrastructure. The goal of the research was to develop a novel and cost-effective technology securing distributed communications across utility-owned DER systems. To achieve this, our approach was to design a flexible and lightweight cryptographic module for grid-edge devices focusing on end-to-end encryption. This provides integrity to the command-and-control messages in transit to and from DERs mitigating cyber threats, such as man-in-the-middle, and securing DER communications to the electric grid.The Modular Security Apparatus for Managing Distributed Cryptography for Command-and-Control Messages on Operational Technology Networks (Module-OT) (Hupp et al. 2020) improves the cybersecurity posture of DER systems in a holistic way by providing authentication, authorization, and data integrity to secure DER communications. Additionally, it performs key management, provides data security through whitelisting Internet Protocol addresses and ports, blocks unauthorized connections, controls user access, and allows serial or Ethernet connections for added flexibility. The core software is portable to various Linux-based operating systems and is developed to be customized by the developer and researcher communities. Module-OT is open source and available via GitHub to encourage active development and deployment.The development of Module-OT involved a comprehensive survey of existing cybersecurity and interoperability standards as well as a stakeholder workshop. Industry feedback came from a mix of utilities and technology vendors in addit...

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“…Second, the optimization-based operation takes both the economic cost and the detection effectiveness into account, in which the metric of detection effectiveness is maximized or taken as constraints [128], [130]. Finally, the hidden MTD operation method delicately selects D-FACTS setpoints such that all measurements remain the same after MTD is applied [134]- [136]. In this case, vigilant attackers cannot detect the MTD in place using BDD.…”

Section: E Moving Target Defensementioning

confidence: 99%

Smart Grid Cyber-Physical Attack and Defense: A Review

2021

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Recent advances in the cyber-physical smart grid (CPSG) have enabled a broad range of new devices based on the information and communication technology (ICT). However, these ICT-enabled devices are susceptible to a growing threat of cyber-physical attacks. This paper performs a thorough review of the state-of-the-art cyber-physical security of the smart grid. By focusing on the physical layer of the CPSG, this paper provides an abstracted and unified state-space model, in which cyber-physical attack and defense models can be effectively generalized. The existing cyber-physical attacks are categorized in terms of their target components. We then discuss several operational and informational defense approaches that present the current state-of-the-art in the field, including moving target defense, watermarking, and datadriven approaches. Finally, we discuss challenges and future opportunities associated with the smart grid cyber-physical security. INDEX TERMS Cyber-physical power system, cyber-physical security, false data injection, dynamic watermarking, moving target defense.

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Hidden Moving Target Defense against False Data Injection in Distribution Network Reconfiguration

Cited by 26 publications

References 8 publications

An Interior-Point Solver for Optimal Power Flow Problem Considering Distributed FACTS Devices

An Interior-Point Solver for Optimal Power Flow Problem Considering Distributed FACTS Devices

Modular Security Apparatus for Managing Distributed Cryptography for Command-and-Control Messages on Operational Technology Networks (Module-OT)

Smart Grid Cyber-Physical Attack and Defense: A Review

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