Hierarchical Control

Abstract

Formal theories of accountability and bureaucratic politics typically consider voter-politician interactions in isolation from politician-bureaucrat interactions. In this paper, we study a model of electoral accountability with a hierarchy consisting of a voter, a politician, and a bureaucrat. The politician and bureaucrat both produce government output valued by the voter. The voter controls the politician via election and the politician provides incentives to bureaucrats, who may have conflicting interests. We show that when times are conducive to high quality governance -- budgets are large and players are farsighted -- incorporating the bureaucratic layer of the hierarchy makes for weaker accountability standards. However, when times are tough and budgets are small or players are myopic it is possible that voters may benefit from increasing their demands on elected officials. These accountability standards change even when reelection does not depend at all on the bureaucrat's output directly.

Welfare of broilers on farm

“…Rowan Ranger Classic with a weight gain around 50 g per day (Aviagen, 2018c) and, as an example of an even slower-growing hybrid, Sasso broilers reach their slaughtering age of 2.2-2.4 kg in 88 days. Sasso broilers are sold for small scale and organic farmers with access to free range (Sasso, 2020). As culling of male chicks has been banned in some European countries, males of dual-purpose hybrids (animals bred for meat and egg production) are a good alternative to slowergrowing broilers.…”

Sources, Scope, and Application of the Law on Legitimate Targets in Armed Conflicts

“…197 There is actually no consensus on that issue; certainly not everyone agrees that proportionality is irrelevant when it comes to lawful targets. 198 Each IHL principle should be interpreted in light of its other principles. Whether or not the principles of proportionality, humanity, military necessity, prohibition of unnecessary suffering, etc., are directly invoked, the fact remains that murder without a clear need for it is not allowed.…”

“…208 However, I think that a differentiation of standards of the use of force in IAC and NIAC is completely impracticable: the training of troops must be consistent regardless of the type of conflict. 209 Furthermore, while international courts have not so far questioned the legality of attacks against legitimate targets, 210 national courts have in some cases enforced the standard of graduated use of force. 211 Interestingly, even the practices of states that have opposed the principle of graduated use of force against military objectives demonstrate a certain willingness on the part of these states to comply with this rule and thus limit the impact of the use of force to the extent to which it is possible.…”

How to Cope with Diversity While Preserving Unity in Customary International Law? Some Insights from International Humanitarian Law

“…101 Yet, these problems aside, it cannot be denied that a consideration of armed groups' practice and views is necessary in law-making processes, not in a formal sense, but to prevent the legal framework from becoming overly biased towards the needs and aspirations of states. 102 As Sasso `li has pertinently pointed out, if the views of only one party are taken into account in the making of international humanitarian law, it will inevitably become 'less realistic and effective'. 103 Significantly-across the board in literature on non-state actors-it is noted that if the views of actors are excluded from law making entirely, there is a high risk of their non-compliance.…”