Hindsight bias: An interaction of automatic and motivational factors?

Abstract

If subjects are asked to recollect a former response after having been informed about the correct response, their recollection tends to approach the correct response. This effect has been termed hindsight bias. We studied hindsight bias in an experiment requiring numerical responses to almanac-type questions for physical quantities. We varied (l) the time at which the correct information was provided, (2) the encoding of the original responses by asking/not asking subjects to give a reason for the respective response, and (3) the motivation to recall correctly. We found that hindsight is less biased if reasons are given and if the correct information is provided at an earlier time. Motivation had only interactive effects: (1) With high motivation to recall correctly, the time the correct information was provided had no influence. (2) With reasons given, the variation of motivation showed no effect. These results rule out purely motivational and purely automatic explanations.Subjects who are asked almanac-type questions and are given the correct information at a later time have been found to "correct" their memory for their original responses in the direction of the correct response (e.g. , Fischhoff, 1977). This result has been termed distorted or biasedhindsight. Hindsight bias has been demonstrated for several types of knowledge: football game results

Not the same old hindsight bias: Outcome information distorts a broad range of retrospective judgments

“…Such reports would at least make them appear consistent in the face of having made an inaccurate decision and preserve the possibility that they are skillful decision makers in other contexts. In general, these results are consistent with other research on the hindsight bias, suggesting that motivational explanations for the bias are not sufficient (e.g., see Hawkins & Hastie, 1990;Hell et al, 1988).…”

“…In Fischhoff 's (1975) explanation of the hindsight bias, it was an automatic phenomenon; outcome information automatically altered people's recollections of the past, quickly and permanently supplanting previous knowledge, a process Fischhoff termed creeping determinism. The conceptualization of the hindsight bias as an automatic phenomenon has been supported in subsequent research (see, e.g., Hawkins & Hastie, 1990;Hell, Gigerenzer, Gauggel, Mall, & Müller, 1988;Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000;Pohl, 1998;Pohl & Hell, 1996).…”

Explaining individual differences in cognitive processes underlying hindsight bias

“…Dehn & Erdfelder, 1998;Hell et al, 1988;McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985;Stahlberg & Maass, 1998 Reconstruction theories have received more attention than recollection theories, and researchers have developed several models to explain the mechanisms by which reconstruction bias can occur (see Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991;Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway, & Posavac, 2004;Hawkins & Hastie, 1990, for reviews). Two popular reconstruction theories are the anchoring and adjustment theory and the rejudgment theory.…”

“…In the existing aging literature, researchers have assessed HB using a memory judgment task (Hell et al, 1988), which involves participants providing original judgments (OJ) to trivia questions (e.g., "How long is the Nile River?"). Later, they learn the correct answers (referred to as correct judgments or CJ) to half of the questions (experimental items), but not the other half (control items), and then recall their original judgments (ROJ) to all the questions.…”

Auditory hindsight bias: Fluency misattribution versus memory reconstruction.

“…This difference is thought to derive from the fact that some participants in memory designs may be able to accurately recollect their earlier foresight rating, which would result in bias-free hindsight ratings. Indeed, longer retention intervals between the original foresight ratings and the later hindsight ratings have been shown to increase hindsight bias in memory designs (e.g., Blank et al, 2003;Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975;Hell, Gigerenzer, Gauggel, Mall, & Müller, 1988;Pennington, 1981), presumably because fewer participants are able to accurately recollect their previous ratings. Conversely, because participants only make one rating in hypothetical designs, they do not have foresight ratings to recollect.…”