Hired Guns: Using Pro-Government Militias for Political Competition

Raleigh, Clionadh; Kishi, Roudabeh

doi:10.1080/09546553.2017.1388793

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…Our focus covers both pro-government non-state (PGN) groups such as militias, paramilitaries, auxiliaries, and mercenaries, and anti-government groups such as rebels and insurgents (see e.g. Carey, Colaresi & Mitchell, 2015; Raleigh & Kishi, 2020). Non-state actor activity ranges from benign organizational efforts (e.g.…”

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confidence: 99%

COVID-19, state capacity, and political violence by non-state actors

Koehnlein¹,

Koren

2022

Journal of Peace Research

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The COVID-19 pandemic has constrained the ability of states across the world to govern and control their territories. As the state reduces its activities, space opens for violent non-state actors working for and against the state to fill the vacuum. Highlighting this trend, the present study evaluates the effects of COVID-19 and pandemics more broadly on attacks by non-state actors. Our theory emphasizes the incentives of both rebels and pro-government non-state actors (PGNs) to increase their attack frequency as disease spreads and the state retracts its governance activities to preserve resources needed elsewhere. In the first case, we highlight how the pandemic allows rebels to reduce asymmetries of power with respect to the military and establish themselves as a viable government alternative. In the second case, PGNs, which provide an alternative to militaries, are deployed to these contested spaces to thwart or pre-empt rebellion during the pandemic. Employing daily-level data on the annual change in armed conflict and COVID-19 cases across 127 countries between 1 January 2020 and 15 June 2020, we test both claims using an econometric identification strategy. We do not find clear evidence that COVID-19 led to a higher frequency of rebel attacks, suggesting that these groups prefer to bolster their standing using nonviolent means, or avoid fighting and preserve their resources. In contrast, we find that the frequency of PGN attacks has increased with COVID-19 prevalence compared with last year. Case studies of insurgent and PGN activity in Afghanistan and Nigeria lend additional support to these results, illustrating some underlying mechanisms. Our findings explore overlooked challenges that pandemics and other disasters pose to conflict mitigation and the role PGNs play in these contexts.

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confidence: 99%

COVID-19, state capacity, and political violence by non-state actors

Koehnlein¹,

Koren

2022

Journal of Peace Research

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“…Moreover, the militias would sometimes deliberately supply faulty intelligence to regular force thus sabotaging State operation. Furthermore, some militias tend to politicize their campaign by engaging in political thuggery (Peic, 2014;Ahram, 2014;Raleigh and Kishi, 2018). Gurur (2013) have equally reported this challenge with the Raia Mutomboki militias in the Democratic Republic of Congo.…”

Section: Drivers Of Militia Involvement In Counterinsurgency In Yobe Statementioning

confidence: 99%

Joining Militia; Understanding the Drivers of Militia Participation in Counterinsurgency Operation in Yobe State, Nigeria

Gana

2020

EJBS

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The Nigeria government has been fighting a protracted insurgency by Boko Haram since 2009. Despite the concerted multifaceted counterinsurgency approach, the insurgent sustained its violence with impunity. However, the participation of militia to support the government significantly suppressed the insurgent hostilities, reduced both attack frequencies and fatalities. Even though the militias succeed in the operation, but what motivates them to engage in the militia is not address. This article, therefore, drawing data from interviews and field observations, this study investigated the drivers of the militias in Yobe State. The case study is at Geidam involving 15 participants from three groups that include the militia participants, government officials, and community leaders. The find revealed poverty and unemployment are the key drivers of militias' participation in the operation. However, the study recommends that Nigeria and Yobe State governments should regulate the militia activities to avoid excessiveness. Nigeria's government should re-strategize its counterinsurgency campaign toward the people-centered operation. Others are the recruitment of more state counterinsurgent forces by the government.

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“…On some occasions this violence might be the intention of the ruling regime, who use militia forces to avoid responsibility for violence used on their behalf (e.g. Raleigh and Kishi 2018;Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015). In other cases, it might be the by-product of using PGMs that are less accountable and less disciplined than the official armed forces.…”

Section: Co-ethnic Pgms and Conflict Intensitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A common strategy is to mobilize or co-opt irregular PGM forces that share a similar ethnicity to the incumbent government. Incumbents delegate violence to co-ethnic PGMs in order to circumnavigate the principal–agent problem (Kirschke 2000; McLaughlin 2010) and augment military capacity while evading responsibility for violence (Raleigh and Kishi 2018). Ruling elites can be more confident that militia groups share similar incentives when they are comprised of in-group members.…”

Section: Ethnic Pgmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…An earlier study offered some preliminary evidence to this effect showing that co-ethnic militia in African conflicts that are committed to defending a particular ethnically defined political party, regime, or elite tend to perpetrate higher levels of human rights violations than other types of ethnic PGMs (such as defectors; Magid and Schon 2018). On some occasions, this violence might be the intention of the ruling regime, who use militia forces to avoid responsibility for violence used on their behalf (e.g., Raleigh and Kishi 2018; Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2015). In other cases, it might be the by-product of using PGMs that are less accountable and less disciplined than the official armed forces.…”

Section: Co-ethnic Pgm and The Dynamics Of Civil Warmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Ties That Bind: Ethnicity, Pro-government Militia, and the Dynamics of Violence in Civil War

Abbs

Clayton

Thomson

2019

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Existing research reveals many of the ways pro-government militia (PGM) shape civil violence but overlooks how the ethno-political ties between the state and a PGM might influence these effects. We argue that co-ethnic militia (i.e., groups composed of the ruling elite’s ethnic kin) are relatively loyal irregular forces that multiply state military capacity. The greater loyalty of co-ethnic groups mitigates principal–agent problems but further polarizes ethnic communities, and as a result, co-ethnic PGMs are likely to be associated with longer and more intense civil conflict. We test this argument on a global sample of cases from 1989 to 2007 using new data capturing the ethnic ties of all PGMs. The results support our claims that co-ethnic militia are associated with more intense and longer civil conflict.

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Hired Guns: Using Pro-Government Militias for Political Competition

Cited by 12 publications

References 0 publications

COVID-19, state capacity, and political violence by non-state actors

COVID-19, state capacity, and political violence by non-state actors

Joining Militia; Understanding the Drivers of Militia Participation in Counterinsurgency Operation in Yobe State, Nigeria

The Ties That Bind: Ethnicity, Pro-government Militia, and the Dynamics of Violence in Civil War

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