History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System

Подвиг, Павел

doi:10.1080/08929880212328

Cited by 29 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“… Oko is the Russian defence constellation for early warning. It was launched over forty years into Molniya orbits with 600 km perigee altitude and 63.7 degrees of inclination The Oko spacecraft appearing in this survey have drifted from their orbit gaining perigee altitude to now lie entirely within the MEO [14].…”

Section: Survey Of Meo Objectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A passive satellite deorbiting strategy for medium earth orbit using solar radiation pressure and the J2 effect

2012

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R c coefficient of reflectivity e eccentricity crit e critical eccentricity f true anomaly [rad]F solar flux [W/m 2 ] H Hamiltonian i inclination [rad] 2 J second order zonal harmonic coefficient of the Earth n rotational rate of the Earth around the Sun [rad/s] E R radius of the Earth [m]  solar radiation pressure parameter  J 2 effect parameter  angle of position of the Sun on ecliptic with respect to the vernal equinox [rad]  gravitational parameter of the Earth  argument of perigee [rad]  right ascension of the ascending node [rad]  angle between the direction of the solar radiation and the radius of the perigee [rad] area-to-mass ratio [m 2 /kg]

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Section: Survey Of Meo Objectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A passive satellite deorbiting strategy for medium earth orbit using solar radiation pressure and the J2 effect

2012

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“…The Soviet Union sought a look-down capability equivalent to the U.S. DSP satellites starting in 1979, and the first Soviet satellite with this capability was launched in 1991 with limited success; as late as 2002, it was still described as "an essentially experimental program." 36 Instead, the Soviet Union relied throughout the 1980s on a system of satellites in very elliptical orbits that did not look directly at the Earth but waited for the missile plume to become visible against the background of space.…”

Section: Geosynchronous Infrared Satellitesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…63 One description, again by Bruce Blair, suggests the following expected sequence of events following detection by satellites or ground-based radars of a possible missile launch: 64 1. Positive attack identification from satellites (about one minute after launch) or radar would lead to a warning report by the Center for the Analysis of Missile and Space Situation, the Russian counterpart of NORAD, to Defense headquarters, general staff, and strategic rocket forces.…”

Section: Soviet/russian Early Warning Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Early Warning in South Asia—Constraints and Implications

Миан

Rajaraman

Ramana

2003

Science & Global Security

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Geography makes ballistic missile flight times between India and Pakistan very short. This has serious consequences for the feasibility and utility of possible early warning systems that could be set up in India or Pakistan to detect incoming missiles from the other side. In this article, we show how one can estimate the time taken for a missile flight from expected launch sites to targets, both analytically and numerically. We find the flight time can be as little as 300 seconds. Then we examine the two standard technologies for detecting incoming missiles-radars and geostationary satellites with infrared detectors-keeping in mind the state of the art likely to obtain in the two countries. Our calculations indicate that the warning times provided by the two methods are roughly equal to one another and, given our estimates of missile transit time, are at best enough for confirming the signals as genuine. There would be no time at all for consultations or deliberation by decision makers. Any response would have to be predetermined and automatic. If such an automatic response involves a launch on warning posture, as is the case with the U.S. and Russia, there is a significant likelihood of accidental nuclear war from false alarms.

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“…One expert assesses that the "system appears to be capable of detecting a massive attack, but cannot be relied upon to detect individual launches" and cannot cover all possible launch areas. 19 The argument could also be made that the Russian system would be able to identify the missile (by comparing it to system characteristics in its database) and determine it was not an ICBM or a submarine-launched ballistic missile. However, in 1995, the Russian early warning system mistook a Norwegian sounding rocket for a missile attack by U.S. submarines in the Barents Sea and activated President Boris Yeltsin's nuclear briefcase to authorize the launch of a nuclear strike.…”

Section: Confidence-buildingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deploying Missile Defense: Major Operational Challenges

Bunn¹

2004

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By October 2004, the United States will have begun initial deployment of a missile defense capability-albeit a modest, limited, and not completely proven one-to defend the homeland against a limited ballistic missile attack.The gradual phase-in of ballistic missile defense deployments will mark an important change in the policy context of the missile defense issue. Past debate focused on whether missile defenses should be deployed and whether they would work. These issues will now share the limelight with another pressing question: how would missile defenses actually be used? Operating a missile defense system presents seven challenges: To manage the transition to defense, policy guidance to address these challenges will have to be somewhat flexible; it will likely evolve over time, based on the evolution of the system as well as operational experience and future testing using varied assumptions and scenarios.If all goes according to plan, by the end of 2004, the United States will deploy eight groundbased midcourse defense (GMD) interceptors 1 in Alaska and California, along with land-, sea-, and space-based sensors and the command and control systems to support the interceptors. By the end of 2005, 12 more GMD interceptors will be added, along with additional sensors and interceptor missiles on Navy ships.The initial deployments of 2004-2005 are only the first step on the path to the Bush administration goal of an integrated, global missile defense 2 to protect the United States, its friends and allies, and deployed forces against limited attacks by ballistic missiles of all ranges (short-, medium-, intermediate-, and longrange) in all phases of flight (boost, midcourse, and terminal).

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History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System

Cited by 29 publications

References 3 publications

A passive satellite deorbiting strategy for medium earth orbit using solar radiation pressure and the J2 effect

A passive satellite deorbiting strategy for medium earth orbit using solar radiation pressure and the J2 effect

Early Warning in South Asia—Constraints and Implications

Deploying Missile Defense: Major Operational Challenges

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