Holes

Lewis, David; Lewis, Stephanie

doi:10.1080/00048407012341181

Cited by 106 publications

(46 citation statements)

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“…5-7 for a survey); properties are oft identified with sets of their instances (Lewis 1986, pp. 50-69) or sets of tropes; holes have been identified with hole linings (Lewis and Lewis 1970) and regions of spacetime (Wake et al 2007); works of music have been identified with fusions of their performances (Caplan and Matheson 2006) and so on and so forth. So there is a presumption that, where we can, we make such identifications.…”

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confidence: 99%

The metaphysics of groups

Effingham

2009

Philos Stud

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If you are a realist about groups (e.g. religious institutions, football teams, the Mafia etc.) there are three main theories of what to identify groups with. I offer reasons for thinking that two of those theories (groups as sui generis entities and groups as mereological fusions) fail to meet important desiderata. The third option is to identify groups with sets, which meets all of the desiderata if only we take care over which sets they are identified with. I then canvass some possible objections to that third theory, and explain how to avoid them.

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confidence: 99%

The metaphysics of groups

Effingham

2009

Philos Stud

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“…In defence of this position they go to considerable lengths to show that it can provide satisfactory solutions to the various metaphysical puzzles raised by holes. They also provide a battery of arguments against the most developed materialist account of holes, given by David and Stephanie Lewis in their incisive and entertaining paper 'Holes' (Lewis and Lewis 1970), in which they offer an account of holes as a certain kind of material object: the material surfaces of material objects. More recently I have advanced the view that holes should not be construed as objects of any sort, neither material nor immaterial (Meadows 2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Holes Cannot Be Counted as Immaterial Objects

Meadows

2014

Erkenn

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In this paper I argue that the theory that holes are immaterial objects faces an objection that has traditionally been thought to be the principal difficulty with its main rival, which construes holes as material parts of material objects. Consequently, one of the principal advantages of identifying holes with immaterial objects is illusory: its apparent ease of accounting for truths about number of holes. I argue that in spite of this we should not think of holes as material parts of material objects. This is because the theory that holes are properties does not face the same difficulties as either of these theories that construe holes as objects of some sort.

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“…(1) Both holes and cast shadows (henceforth 'shadows') are dependent features; they cannot exist without objects hosting/casting them. Both shadows and holes are in between being full-fledged material objects and regions of space: (2) they are similar enough to bounded regions of space, have a location, a shape, a size, and are as immaterial as space is, but (3) they are more object-like as they can persist over time and move 1 .…”

Section: The Cognitive Science Of Holes and Cast Shadowsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The cognitive science of holes and cast shadows

Casati

2006

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

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Holes

Cited by 106 publications

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The metaphysics of groups

The metaphysics of groups

Holes Cannot Be Counted as Immaterial Objects

The cognitive science of holes and cast shadows

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