The concept of experience did not fare well during most of the second half of the twentieth century. Poststructuralists condemned experience as belonging to metaphysics; the advocates of Critical Theory scented ideology behind it; and analytical philosophers were too busy concocting impervious definitions to care about experience. 2 By the end of the century, however, the scene had changed significantly, and the idea of experience was fully rehabilitated in academic research. Together with such ideas as presence or materiality, experience was marshalled to overcome the linguistic turn (e.g. Pickering 1997; Mersch 2002; Gumbrecht 2004; Ankersmit 2005; Runia 2006). Perhaps most importantly, experience caters to the current desire to strip down the walls of constructivism and to break free from the prison-house of language. It opens up phenomenological perspectives and resonates powerfully with the current upsurge of cognitive studies. Narrative theory has not remained unaffected by this broad trend to resuscitate the idea of experience. A pioneer in the attempt to place experience center-stage has been Monika Fludernik in her Towards a 'Natural' Narratology, published in 1996. Against traditional approaches, which consider plot to be the key of narrative, Fludernik argued that narrativity is constituted by experientiality, that is, "the quasi-mimetic evocation of 'real-life experience'" (9): "In my model there can therefore be narratives without plot, but there cannot be narratives without a human experience of some sort at some narrative level" (13). 3 The notion of experience enabled Fludernik to make a move that has profoundly changed how many of us understand narrative: a shift from formalist to cognitive approaches. Pivotal as the idea of experience is in natural narratology, its significance for narrative has, I think, not yet been fully charted out. In fact, a fresh look at the tradition of continental philosophy can show us that experience need not be pitted against plot. The history of narratology makes it obvious why Fludernik emphasized that experience can center on "mental simulations," that it can be, as she puts it, "quite uneventful" (29). Eager to move away from formalist approaches, Fludernik replaced the focus on plot with a focus on 1 I wish to thank John Pier for his comments and suggestions.