2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.02.002
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Honesty through repeated interactions

Abstract: In the study of signaling, it is well known that the cost of deception is an essential element for stable honest signaling in nature. In this paper, we show how costs for deception can arise endogenously from repeated interactions between individuals. Utilizing the Sir Philip Sidney game as an illustrative case, we show that repeated interactions can sustain honesty with no observable signal costs, even when deception cannot be directly observed. We provide a number of potential experimental tests for this the… Show more

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Cited by 13 publications
(13 citation statements)
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“…Indeed, in colonially breeding species, like roseate terns, parents should discriminate their mobile offspring from others' during both pre‐ and postfledging periods to avoid costs of misdirected parental care (Aubin & Jouventin, ; Levréro et al, ). In such a situation, offspring cheating may be rare because it is unlikely that a nonparent will be fooled by a dishonest HY; thus, there may be few benefits to gain from cheating (Rich & Zollman, ; Zollman et al, ). Although we found little evidence of adult aggression toward offspring in our system, it is possible that aggressive interactions between nonparents and cheating offspring may mediate the honesty of begging at parents versus nonparents (Davies, ); however, we were unable to evaluate this hypothesis with our data.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Indeed, in colonially breeding species, like roseate terns, parents should discriminate their mobile offspring from others' during both pre‐ and postfledging periods to avoid costs of misdirected parental care (Aubin & Jouventin, ; Levréro et al, ). In such a situation, offspring cheating may be rare because it is unlikely that a nonparent will be fooled by a dishonest HY; thus, there may be few benefits to gain from cheating (Rich & Zollman, ; Zollman et al, ). Although we found little evidence of adult aggression toward offspring in our system, it is possible that aggressive interactions between nonparents and cheating offspring may mediate the honesty of begging at parents versus nonparents (Davies, ); however, we were unable to evaluate this hypothesis with our data.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Alternatively, an evolutionarily stable strategy may still be achieved in the absence of high costs if there is little to be gained from displaying the behavior dishonestly (Royle, Hartley, & Parker, ). For example, begging may not be a particularly costly behavior for fledged chicks, but this behavior may remain honest due to a relatively low payoff of cheating (e.g., begging at unrelated adults or soliciting more care than needed may not result in feeding; Zollman, Bergstrom, & Huttegger, , Rich & Zollman, ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…For example, many religious markers, such as head coverings or adornments, are not intrinsically linked to their bearer's character, but are, however, policed by others. Such arbitrary links could be sustained when signals are at least partially verifiable: that is, receivers can in the long term evaluate when signals are dishonest . Establishing the conditions under which signal costs should, or should not, be tightly related to signal content is an important area for further study.…”
Section: Future Directionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Repeated interactions with individuals that can be individually recognized may be important in allowing receivers to learn about the behaviour of specific signallers [32]. Such contexts also allow receivers to attend more to specific signallers that have demonstrated signal reliability, and provide a mechanism that can ensure signal honesty [33]. Such effects have been studied in relation to alarm calls, where theoretical models demonstrate fitness benefits that accrue to individuals discriminating between specific signallers [34], and where empirical data suggests that receivers do indeed preferentially attend to the calls of reliable signallers (e.g.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%