House Allocation with Transfers

Miyagawa, Eiichi

doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2703

Cited by 48 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…The search for "good" house allocation rules, i.e., rules with desirable properties, is the subject of many recent papers (for instance, Sönmez 1998, 1999;Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001;Chambers 2004;Ehlers et al 2002;Ehlers andKlaus 2003, 2005;Ehlers et al 2002;Ergin 2000;Kesten 2004a,b;Pápai 2000;Svensson 1999). Recent articles that pursue a similar research agenda in closely related models with monetary compensations are Miyagawa (2001), Ohseto (2005), Schummer (2000), Svensson (2004), Svensson and Larsson (2002), and Thomson (2003). 1 In most real life problems "priorities" naturally arise.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consistent House Allocation

Ehlers

Klaus

2006

Economic Theory

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In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency must be an efficient generalized priority rule; i.e., it must adapt to an acyclic priority structure, except -maybe -for up to three agents in each object's priority ordering.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consistent House Allocation

Ehlers

Klaus

2006

Economic Theory

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“…This reinforces the market-based approach even in the presence of indifferences. Related characterizations of competitive rules with fixed prices have been obtained by Barberà and Jackson (1995) and Miyagawa (2001) by using properties similar to ours. Furthermore, the proof reveals that our result is true for any domain in between the strict preferences and the weak preferences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 64%

“…In a sense this is not surprising because our rules are competitive with fixed tie-breaking. The same feature is shared in Barberà and Jackson (1995) where in classical exchange economies competitive rules with fixed prices (or fixed proportions) are characterized and in Miyagawa (2001) where with indivisible goods and monetary compensations competitive rules with fixed prices are characterized. Interestingly, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness are common properties used in Theorem 1 and their characterizations.…”

Section: Top Trading With Fixed Tie-breakingmentioning

confidence: 87%

Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods

Ehlers¹

2014

Journal of Economic Theory

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We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible. Each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects. When preferences are strict, Gale's top trading cycle algorithm finds the unique core allocation. When preferences are not necessarily strict, we use an exogenous profile of tie-breakers to resolve any ties in individuals' preferences and apply Gale's top trading cycle algorithm for the resulting profile of strict preferences. We provide a foundation of these simple extensions of Gale's top trading cycle algorithm from strict preferences to weak preferences. We show that Gale's top trading cycle algorithm with fixed tie-breaking is characterized by individual rationality, strategy-proofness, weak efficiency, non-bossiness, and consistency. Our result supports the common practice in applications to break ties in weak preferences using some fixed exogenous criteria and then to use a "good and simple" rule for the resulting strict preferences. This reinforces the market-based approach even in the presence of indifferences because always competitive allocations are chosen.JEL Classification: C78, D63, D70

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“…Such environments occur naturally in connection with, for example, public good provision models with projects of variable size (Green and Laffont [15], [16], Laffont and Maskin [22]), cost sharing agreements (Moulin [31], [32]), allocation models of pollution permits and other common divisible resources (Dasgupta et al [11], Duggan and Roberts [13], Montero [30]), models of private good allocation with externalities (Jehiel et al [20], [19] and references therein), one-sided matching models with monetary transfers (Miyagawa [29], Schummer [41], Mishra and Roy [27], also Babaioff [3]), and so forth.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains

Carbajal

McLennan

Tourky

2013

Journal of Economic Theory

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Abstract. In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable commodity, we consider three properties that a social choice function may possess: truthful implementation (in dominant strategies); monotonicity in differences; and lexicographic affine maximization. We introduce the notion of a flexible domain of preferences that allows elevation of pairs and study which of these conditions implies which others in such domain. We provide a generalization of the theorem of Roberts [36] in restricted valuation domains. Flexibility holds (and the theorem is not vacuous) if the domain of valuation profiles is restricted to the space of continuous functions defined on a compact metric space, or the space of piecewise linear functions defined on an affine space, or the space of smooth functions defined on a compact differentiable manifold. We provide applications of our results to public goods allocation settings, with finite and infinite alternative sets.JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D70, D82.

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House Allocation with Transfers

Cited by 48 publications

References 38 publications

Consistent House Allocation

Consistent House Allocation

Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods

Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains

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