Consistent House Allocation

Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina

doi:10.1007/s00199-005-0077-z

Cited by 41 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…They have provided characterizations under di¤erent domains and for di¤erent additional sets of conditions. A general result about consistent strategy-proof assignment rules is given in Ehlers and Klaus (2007).…”

Section: Three or More Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategyproof Social Choice

Barberà¹

2011

Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare

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Section: Three or More Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategyproof Social Choice

Barberà¹

2011

Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare

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“…However, similar variations are used elsewhere such as , Peleg, Potters and Tijs (1996) and Takamiya (2001). 1 Now we present a full axiomatization of the Pareto correspondence.…”

Section: Theorem 2 the Pareto Correspondence Is The Unique Maximal Comentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Consistent allocation correspondences (and single-valued rules, too) for this environment has first considered by Ergin (2000), and subsequently studied by Ehlers and Klaus (2005) and others. In the previous studies, Pareto efficiency is a prevalent axiom.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consistency and Unanimity in the House Allocation Problems I: Collective Initial Endowments

Takamiya

2006

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThis paper studies allocation correspondences in the house allocation problems with collective initial endowments. We examine the implications of two axioms, namely "consistency" and "unanimity." Consistency requires the allocation correspondence be invariant under reductions of population. Unanimity requires the allocation correspondence respect unanimity, that is, it assigns to every agent the object that ranks best for him whenever possible. We prove that if an allocation correspondence satisfies these two axioms, then it is a subcorrespondence of the Pareto correspondence. Further, we give a characterization of the Pareto correspondence using a version of "converse consistency." JEL Classification-C78, D70.

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“…3 Manzini and Mariotti (2007) and Mandler (2015) characterize choice functions that arise out of such procedures. 4 Some subsets of the class of hierarchical exchange mechanisms have been described by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1999), Svensson (1999), Ergin (2000), Ehlers et al (2002), Ehlers and Klaus (2004), Kesten (2009), Ehlers and Klaus (2007), and Velez (2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents

Bade

2016

Soc Choice Welf

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Is the Pareto optimality of matching mechanisms robust to the introduction of boundedly rational behavior? To address this question I define a restrictive and a permissive notion of Pareto optimality and consider the large set of hierarchical exchange mechanisms which contains serial dictatorship as well as Gale's top trading cycles. Fix a housing problem with boundedly rational agents and a hierarchical exchange mechanism. Consider the set of matchings that arise with all possible assignments of agents to initial endowments in the given mechanism. I show that this set is nested between the sets of Pareto optima according to the restrictive and the permissive notion. These containment relations are generally strict, even when deviations from rationality are minimal. In a similar vein, minimal deviations from rationality suffice for the set of outcomes of Gale's top trading cycles with all possible initial endowments to differ from the set of outcomes of serial dictatorship with all possible orders of agents as dictators. Mathematics Subject Classification C78 · D03 · D60I would like to thank Christoph Engel, Olga Gorelkina, Martin Hellwig, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Michael Mandler, Paola Manzini, and two anonymous referees. I would like to thank David Bielen for thorough research assistance.

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Consistent House Allocation

Cited by 41 publications

References 21 publications

Strategyproof Social Choice

Strategyproof Social Choice

Consistency and Unanimity in the House Allocation Problems I: Collective Initial Endowments

Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents

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