House United, House Divided: Explaining the EU's Unity in the Brexit Negotiations

Forging Unity: European Commission Leadership in the Brexit Negotiations

“…It is therefore simplistic to claim with hindsight that the EU's unity was a predestined conclusion (Jensen and Kehlstrup, 2019, p. 2; Glencross, 2018, p.188). Among national and EU officials alike, there was a distinct fear at the onset of the negotiations that the UK would successfully divide‐and‐conquer the member states (Interviews #2, #5, #6, #7).…”

“…By publishing draft agreements, guidelines, negotiation directives, position papers, and agendas for negotiation rounds, the TF50 used transparency as a negotiation tool (Council of the European Union, 2017). It successfully created the impression that it was both united and well‐prepared for the negotiations, in stark contrast to an opaque and divided UK government (Jensen and Kehlstrup, 2019; Rogers, 2019). Indeed, this strategy seems to have been successful as Eurosceptic parties across the continent no longer want to leave the union and support among the public for membership across the EU increased from 53 per cent in September–October 2016 to 62 per cent in September 2018 (Chopin and Lequesne, 2020; De Vries, 2017; Eurobarometer, 2018).…”

“…This article seeks to explain this puzzling unity among the EU27 and, by extension, the negotiation success. Extant accounts emphasize asymmetrical bargaining constellations (Schimmelfennig, 2018), negotiation errors on part of the UK (Rogers, 2019), path dependencies (McTague, 2019), the maturing of the EU as a strategic polity (Laffan, 2019), or a combination of rational, bureaucratic, identity, and framing factors (Jensen and Kehlstrup, 2019). This article, instead, specifically zooms in on the role of the EU's actual negotiator: the European Commission in form its Task Force for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations with the United Kingdom under Article 50 (TF50) under the leadership of chief negotiator Michel Barnier.…”

How the EU vaccine troubles could have partially been prevented ten years ago

“…Currently the EU's handling of the vaccine procurement and roll out is critiqued [4] , with good reason: Some of manufacturers are not delivering with the promised speed, and the EU has had little control over where the vaccines that they ordered were shipped to. The EU is making one panicked mistake after the other, heeding the debate on a need for a ‘return to nationalism’, just after the unified dealing with the Brexit had left the EU in a more united state [5] . Yet the current problems are caused by precisely this reflex for a return to nationalism and ‘go at it alone’ mentality that we witnessed in the Swine Flu outbreak.…”

Bounded rationality and the Brexit negotiations: why Britain failed to understand the EU

“…Nor was Brussels amenable to relaxing aspects of the integration project to facilitate a beneficial arrangement for the British and member states were in agreement on the indivisibility of the 'four freedoms' and the sanctity of the EU's legal and decision-making architecture (De Vries 2017). Unity among the EU27 on the conduct of the Brexit negotiations was high and the member states were able to agree a common position, and an institutional structure to support this, affording them greater unity than the British side and precluding the use of 'divide-and-rule' strategies (Jensen and Kelstrup 2019;Laffan 2019). The EU27 feared a successful Brexit and were willing to forego economic growth to ensure this did not happen.…”