How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why

Barany, Zoltán

doi:10.1515/9781400880997

Cited by 29 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This choice can be justified on theoretical grounds since this paper is concerned with tracing how the causal factor of interest (management of MOBs as a proxy for financial autonomy) can be linked to the expected outcome (defection) in the autocratic regimes that experienced mass protests. This choice comes not only because case studies "are the major source of evidence" in comparative politics (Geddes, 2003) but also because the in-depth knowledge of the cases can bolster our understanding, if not predicting, of the specific courses of action in which such critical situations eventually unfold (Barany, 2016).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is because the chances for Published by SCHOLINK INC. military defection are believed to be highest during mass protests against the regime and with the lack of a clear constitutional exit for the political crisis faced (Pion-Berlin & Trinkunas, 2010). Put differently, military defection is a key factor in the success of protest campaigns and is increasingly taken as the main reason behind the dictator's departure from office (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) and (Barany, 2016). This come in line with the logic that for military's political interventions to happen, they require not only a "motive" or interest and/or grievance as a push factor, but also an "opportunity", or as a pull factor.…”

Section: Military Defection and Regime Changementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

“Defection-Proofing” the Military and Authoritarian Regime Survival

Soliman¹

2021

WJSSR

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The question of loyalty in autocratic regimes has drawn a sustained scholarly interest, especially as autocratic leaders need to secure the support of their militaries to survive in office and to minimize the risk of a coup. Among the commonly employed mechanisms in this regard is the extension of extra-budgetary financial rewards, including “Military-Owned Businesses (MOBs)”. Nevertheless, under the increasingly significant threat of an uprising from below, military defection remains the key for the success of the revolution. The question then becomes: under what conditions would a military defect from an autocratic ruling alliance? This paper presents one novel answer to this question, which is: militaries are “defection-proofed” in the face of mass uprisings when they develop financial dependency on the regime. This hypothesis is tested comparatively against the cases of mass protests in China (1989), Indonesia (1998), Thailand (2006), and Iran (2009).

show abstract

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Military Defection and Regime Changementioning

confidence: 99%

“Defection-Proofing” the Military and Authoritarian Regime Survival

Soliman¹

2021

WJSSR

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Soldiers have staged coups for personal reasons such as private political convictions or unfulfilled career ambitions, but "the defense or enhancement of the military's corporate interests is easily the most important interventionist motive" (Nordlinger, 1977: 65). 4 Research suggests that soldiers particularly fear for the military's corporate interests when they are confronted with peaceful protests (Barany, 2016). If governments order harsh repression to quell nonviolent resistance, officers and the rank and file carefully consider the risks of internal divisions, reputational damage, and international repercussions (DeMeritt, 2015: 432-434;Janowitz, 1988: 113).…”

Section: Research On Civil-military Relations and Coupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Regarding soldiers' coup disposition, the Arab Spring created the expectation that militaries confronted with peaceful demonstrations oust their repressive governments in solidarity with the people in the streets (e.g. Barany, 2016;Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011;Johnson and Thyne, 2018;Nepstad, 2011). In many political settings, however, alliances between protesters and the military are implausible (Holmes and Koehler, 2020;O'Donnell, 1988).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Grist to the mill of subversion: strikes and coups in counterinsurgencies

Gläßel

González

Scharpf

2020

European Journal of International Relations

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Why are acts of organized resistance associated with coups? Inspired by the Arab Spring, a large literature suggests that militaries confronted with civil resistance tend to side with protesters and oust their government. In the historically most coup-prone environment of insurgencies, however, alliances between the military and protesters are implausible because soldiers suspect insurgents behind social dissent. Disentangling different types of resistance, this article analyzes whether and how strikes, demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla attacks affect the military’s disposition and ability to stage a coup during counterinsurgencies. We argue that only strikes trigger coup attempts. Soldiers interpret strikes as manifestations of a strengthening subversive enemy that threatens their victory over insurgents, while economic elites support a coup in the hope that the military will terminate costly walkouts. This interest alignment fosters military takeovers. We provide case-study evidence from Cold War Argentina and Venezuela to show our suggested mechanism at work. Demonstrating the scope of our argument, we quantitatively analyze coup attempts in counterinsurgency worldwide (1950–2005). Results show that strikes increase wartime coup risk, whereas demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla attacks do not. The findings highlight the backfiring potential of nonviolent resistance with important implications for post-coup political orders and democratization prospects.

show abstract

“…These cautionary tales highlight the military’s paramount importance during revolutionary episodes, the outcomes of which often hinge on the military’s willingness to repress popular demands for change. For this reason, recent scholarship has explored how the military decides whether to “defect or defend” (Barany, 2016; Bellin, 2012; Brooks, 2013; Lee, 2014) in response to mass protests.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Military Conscription and Nonviolent Resistance

Cebul

Grewal

2022

Comparative Political Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Nonviolent campaigns against repressive regimes often turn on the military’s decision to either defend the ruler or make common cause with the ruled. Yet surprisingly little scholarship investigates opposition expectations for the military’s likely response to mass protest. We theorize that some determinants of the military’s willingness to repress are more observable to activists than others. In particular, we identify conscription as a highly salient indicator that soldiers will refuse to fire on protesters and hypothesize that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to materialize against regimes with conscripted armies than those with volunteer forces. We substantiate this theory with two sources of evidence: (1) a survey experiment conducted during the 2019 Algerian Revolution and (2) a cross-national analysis of the positive association between conscription and nonviolent campaign onset from 1945 to 2013.

show abstract

How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why

Cited by 29 publications

References 0 publications

“Defection-Proofing” the Military and Authoritarian Regime Survival

“Defection-Proofing” the Military and Authoritarian Regime Survival

Grist to the mill of subversion: strikes and coups in counterinsurgencies

Military Conscription and Nonviolent Resistance

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About