How Communities Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York

Richman, Barak D.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.349040

Cited by 15 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…In contrast to the conventional presumption of nepotism, the authors proposes a transaction cost economic rationale by arguing that family succession is a solution to common agency hazards and the appropriation risk in human capital investments. Finally, Richman (2006) offers a similar explanation in a microanalytic examination of family-run diamond firms.…”

Section: Organization Theorymentioning

confidence: 82%

Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences

2008

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This paper provides a comprehensive review of the empirical literature in transaction cost economics (TCE) across multiple social science disciplines and business fields. We show how TCE has branched out from its economic roots to examine empirical phenomena in several other areas. We find TCE is increasingly being applied not only to business-related fields such as accounting, finance, marketing, and organizational theory, but also to areas outside of business including political science, law, public policy, and agriculture and health. With few exceptions, however, the use of TCE reasoning to inform empirical research in these areas is piecemeal. We find that there is considerable support of many of the central tenets of TCE, but we also observe a number of lingering theoretical and empirical issues that need to be addressed. We conclude by discussing the implications of these issues and outlining directions for future theoretical and empirical work. *We thank Erin Anderson, Christopher Boerner, Scott Masten, Jackson Nickerson, Brian Silverman and especially Oliver Williamson for valuable comments and suggestions. Additional thanks go to Mark Marvelli and Nataliya Kuribko for excellent research assistance. The authors are solely responsible for any errors and omissions, though they ask readers to understand that omissions will be inevitable.Macher and Richman 1

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Section: Organization Theorymentioning

confidence: 82%

Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences

2008

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“…This translates into organizational practices such as an open and honest exchange of relevant information and an inclination to resolve problems through collaboration (Chiles and McMackin, 1996;Dyer and Singh, 1998;Phillips, 2003). Second, the formal contracts linking the firm to its stakeholders tend not to be very detailed because parties rely to a large extent on trust and self-enforcement in the form of social sanctions, rather than legal enforcement (Chiles and McMackin, 1996;Dyer and Singh, 1998;Richman, 2006;Rousseau and Wade-Benzoni, 1994). As a consequence, performance standards and requirements in contracts also tend to be relatively poorly defined (Chiles and McMackin, 1996;Rousseau, 1989;Rousseau and Wade-Benzoni, 1994), which allows them to evolve over time.…”

Section: Fairness and Arms-length Approaches To Stakeholder Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Microfoundations for stakeholder theory: Managing stakeholders with heterogeneous motives

Bridoux

Stoelhorst

2013

Strategic Management Journal

347

315

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“…As demonstrates, however, religious institutions must limit diversification to avoid free riding. 7 Even when secular legal systems are quite efficient we sometimes see religious sects organizing private arbitration, as is the case for Ultra-Orthodox Jews and Jaynes in global diamond exchanges (Richman 2005). announce that he now wanted to take the battle to Jerusalem.…”

Section: Religion Can Demand Sacrifice Whereas Magic Can Only Demandmentioning

confidence: 99%

Religious extremism: The good, the bad, and the deadly

Iannaccone

Berman²

2006

Public Choice

251

121

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This paper challenges conventional views of violent religious extremism, particularly those that emphasize militant theology. We offer an alternative analysis that helps explain the persistent demand for religion, the different types of religious that naturally arise, and the special attributes of the "sectarian" type. Sects are adept at producing club goods -both spiritual and material. Where governments and economies function poorly, sects often become major suppliers of social services, political action, and coercive force. Their success as providers is much more due to the advantages of their organizational structure than it is to their theology. Religious militancy is most effectively controlled through a combination of policies that raise the direct costs of violence, foster religious competition, improve social services, and encourage private enterprise.

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How Communities Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York

Cited by 15 publications

References 56 publications

Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences

Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences

Microfoundations for stakeholder theory: Managing stakeholders with heterogeneous motives

Religious extremism: The good, the bad, and the deadly

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