How Convergence of Research Paradigms Can Improve Research on Diagnostic Judgment

Abstract

The author's purpose is to urge the constructive convergence of two current judgment and decision-making research paradigms. He shows why the heuristics-and-biases approach and the lens-model approach should be placed in the context of two very different metatheories, the coherence metatheory and the correspondence metatheory. The differences between the two research paradigms thus become apparent; they speak to different problems and appeal to different criteria for evaluating performance. Bringing the two into a constructive relationship to one another, however, will not only double the store of knowledge regarding diagnostic judgment and decision making, but also enhance efforts to achieve a cumulative discipline. Isolating these research paradigms from one another—as is done now—stifles theoretical generality, fragments knowledge, and confuses medical decision makers. An example of how convergence can be achieved is provided.

A treatment trade‐off based decision aid for patients with locally advanced non‐small cell lung cancer

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Internal and Substantive Inconsistencies in Decision Making

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