Internal and Substantive Inconsistencies in Decision Making

Hsee, Christopher K.; Zhang, Jiao; Chen, Jun Song

doi:10.1002/9780470752937.ch18

Cited by 19 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 97 publications

(82 reference statements)

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“…Thus, there is a need for further empirical validation of these perspectives, with an eye towards reconciling their fundamental underlying theories. For the Panglossians, continued effort to better understand experienced utility (Hsee et al , 2004; Kahneman, 2000) and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 2000) represent particularly promising areas of emphasis. Social psychologists should continue their pursuit of substantive inconsistencies.…”

Section: Discussion Of Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…the certainty and isolation effects). Hsee, Zhang, and Chen (2004) declare that recognition of such inconsistencies has led to a growing new direction in J/DM research investigating the ‘substantive inconsistencies’ of decisions. A substantive inconsistency occurs when a person's decision is suboptimal according to some external substantive criterion.…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

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The addition of anticipated regret to attitudinally based, goal‐directed models of information search behaviours under conditions of uncertainty and risk

Taylor

2007

British J Social Psychol

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Social science attempts to incorporate emotions into models of judgment and decision making have faced significant theoretical challenges, as well as produced conflicting empirical results. The following study first contributes to the body of knowledge by providing a theoretical explanation for the observed conflicting results from such models. In fact, both extant theory and the results reported herein suggest that a certain amount of variability in results should be expected from empirical investigations based on such models, particularly related to differences in respondents' level of affective versus cognitive involvement. Second, an argument is presented for considering a special case of Perugini and Bagozzi's (2001) Model of Goal-directed Behaviours (MGBs) when investigating these issues using attitude-based explanations of goal-related behaviours. Specifically, empirical evidence is presented for broadening the MGB model by including anticipated regret as an explanatory variable independent of other anticipated emotions, and deepening the theory by calling for multidimensional conceptualizations of the attitude and perceived behavioural control constructs. The implications of the reported study are presented and discussed.

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Section: Discussion Of Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

The addition of anticipated regret to attitudinally based, goal‐directed models of information search behaviours under conditions of uncertainty and risk

Taylor

2007

British J Social Psychol

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“…From other research on probability and risk estimation, as well as from the literature on judgement of utilities (Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002;Hsee, Zhang, & Chen, 2004), there are reasons to believe that people tend to overstate the consequences of an impactful event, and indeed of all events that are singled out for closer inspection. This would be an instance of the ''focusing effect'' described by Legrenzi, Girotto, and Johnson-Laird (1993), or ''focalism'' (to use a term introduced by Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000), and would imply that even some of the plain ''factual'' predictions may have been overstated (e.g., very few drivers sustain serious injuries in car accidents, compared to all who are mildly injured or unharmed).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Going to the other extreme: Counterfactual thinking leads to polarised judgements

Teigen

Kanten

Terum

2011

Thinking & Reasoning

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“…For instance, in GET, preference reversals across evaluation modes are credited to low-evaluability values becoming more evaluable in JE choice relative to SE ratings (see similarly the Prominence Effect; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). Preference reversals (see Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006, for a review) occur when a systematic change in preference order between normatively equivalent conditions is observed (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983) and, as such, represents an internal inconsistency in judgment (Hsee, Zhang, & Chen, 2004;Kahneman, 1994). For example, Hsee (1996) had individuals evaluate job candidates for a programming position on two attributes: GPA and experience.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating Effort: Influences of Evaluation Mode on Judgments of Task‐specific Efforts

Dunn

Koehler

Risko

2017

Behavioral Decision Making

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The claim that humans adapt their actions in ways that avoid effortful processing (whether cognitive or physical) is a staple of various theories of human behavior. Although much work has been carried out focusing on the determinants of such behaviors, less attention has been given to how individuals evaluate effort. In the current set of experiments, we utilized the general evaluability theory to examine the evaluability of effort by examining subjective value functions across different evaluation modes. Individuals judged the anticipated effort of four task‐specific efforts indexed by stimulus rotation, items to be remembered, weight to be lifted, and stimulus degradation across joint (i.e., judged comparatively) and single evaluation modes (i.e., judged in isolation). General evaluability theory hypothesizes that highly evaluable attributes should be consistently evaluated (i.e., demonstrate similar subjective value functions) between the two modes. Across six experiments, we demonstrate that the perceived effort associated with items to be remembered, weight to be lifted, and stimulus degradation can be considered relatively evaluable, while the effort associated with stimulus rotation may be relatively inevaluable. Results are discussed within the context of subjective evaluation, internal reference information, and strategy selection. In addition, methodological implications of evaluation modes are considered. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Internal and Substantive Inconsistencies in Decision Making

Cited by 19 publications

References 97 publications

The addition of anticipated regret to attitudinally based, goal‐directed models of information search behaviours under conditions of uncertainty and risk

The addition of anticipated regret to attitudinally based, goal‐directed models of information search behaviours under conditions of uncertainty and risk

Going to the other extreme: Counterfactual thinking leads to polarised judgements

Evaluating Effort: Influences of Evaluation Mode on Judgments of Task‐specific Efforts

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