How Dictatorships Work

Geddes, Barbara; Wright, Joseph; Frantz, Erica

doi:10.1017/9781316336182

Cited by 344 publications

(198 citation statements)

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“…It is important to explore when electoral autocracies invest on government health expenditure. This paper utilizes government health expenditure (as percent of total general government expenditure) data from World Bank rather than IMF data used by Geddes et al (2018). That is because the raw data for the dataset is inaccessible and sources are not identified in detail in the dataset; in other words, it is hard to verify data generation process of the dataset.…”

Section: Data Measurement and Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Does intense electoral competition increase the government health expenditure in EAs?

Lee¹

2021

Preprint

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Does intense electoral competition in electoral autocracies (EAs) increase the government health expenditure? Previous studies on EAs and public health expenditure focus on the presence of multiparty elections in EAs as a significant determinant on the expenditure. Most of elections in EAs often are unfair because those are for the victory of dictators; hence. multiparty elections per se do not capture well-known impact of elections, such as the electoral competition increasing health expenditure. Some EAs pay health expenditure less than others even though electoral competition is high. This paper analyzes the effect of electoral competition on the government health expenditure with the balanced panel data of 20 EAs from 2001 to 2017. There are two rival arguments on how electoral competition affect the expenditure according to previous studies; (a) a high level of electoral competition indicates a difficulty of dictatorial winning in elections. Autocrats, hence, gather various demands including health issues from voters, and can increase the government health expenditure; (b) Autocrats pursue the victory in elections. Pork and personal benefits to voters rather than programmed policies are helpful for the victory. Therefore, there is no incentive for autocrats to provide government health expenditure to voters when the level of electoral competition is high. Empirical findings demonstrate that electoral competition in EAs lead the decrease of government health expenditure. This paper concludes that electoral competition does not increase the public health expenditure; the higher level of competition in autocracies does not mean that voters can exert their power to autocrats to realize policies.

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Section: Data Measurement and Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The power to nominate candidates by party leaders is the power to control local politicians. The nomination is decided upon behavior of local politicians, such as schools, clinics, and roads, rather than exploiting citizens (Geddes et al, 2018: 140-141).…”

Section: Electoral Competitiveness and Government Health Expenditure mentioning

confidence: 99%

Does intense electoral competition increase the government health expenditure in EAs?

Lee¹

2021

Preprint

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“…143 This variable captures the extent to which "the Party Exercise[s] Control over the Military" on a five-point ordinal scale. 144 The second indicator is the annual rate of coup attempts as given by Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne, 145 which captures levels of military insubordination. Our measure of party rule is a binary indicator of party regime.…”

Section: Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability

Lachapelle¹,

Levitsky²,

Way³

et al. 2020

World Pol.

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This article explores the causes of authoritarian durability. Why do some authoritarian regimes survive for decades, often despite severe crises, while others collapse quickly, even absent significant challenges? Based on an analysis of all authoritarian regimes between 1900 and 2015, the authors argue that regimes founded in violent social revolution are especially durable. Revolutionary regimes, such as those in Russia, China, Cuba, and Vietnam, endured for more than half a century in the face of strong external pressure, poor economic performance, and large-scale policy failures. The authors develop and test a theory that accounts for such durability using a novel data set of revolutionary regimes since 1900. The authors contend that autocracies that emerge out of violent social revolution tend to confront extraordinary military threats, which lead to the development of cohesive ruling parties and powerful and loyal security apparatuses, as well as to the destruction of alternative power centers. These characteristics account for revolutionary regimes’ unusual longevity.

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“…For one thing, autocratic regimes are effectively defined by not allowing major transitions to happen. In autocratic contexts, major alternations in power usually mark the end of a regime, though the old regime is by no means certain to be succeeded by a more democratic regime (see Geddes et al, 2014, 2018: 211–217). In fact, of the 32 cases of autocratic breakdown identified by Del Panto for the period 2000–2015, no less than 21 transitions led to the installation of a new autocratic regime (Del Panto, 2019).…”

Section: Leadership Succession In Democratic and Non-democratic Regimmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leadership succession in politics: The democracy/autocracy divide revisited

Helms

2020

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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Leadership succession marks a truly ubiquitous phenomenon with manifold and wide-ranging implications, which explains the major attention that issues of succession have received in the international literature. Most contributions to the field continue, however, to focus on political succession in either democratic or non-democratic regimes. This article develops an integrated perspective on key aspects of leadership succession at the level of political chief executives in democracies and autocracies. A comparative assessment across time and space reveals several features that challenge established notions, and stereotypes, of leadership succession in democratic and autocratic regimes. The empirical ambivalences identified suggest that the way leaders come to and fall from power should be made a more explicit part of conceptualisations of political regimes, and comparative evaluations of their respective democratic quality.

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How Dictatorships Work

Cited by 344 publications

References 0 publications

Does intense electoral competition increase the government health expenditure in EAs?

Does intense electoral competition increase the government health expenditure in EAs?

Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability

Leadership succession in politics: The democracy/autocracy divide revisited

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