How do we know it is now now?

Braddon‐Mitchell, David

doi:10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00485.x

Cited by 46 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Thereafter, Caesar would be wrong to answer "yes". Cicero then puts it to Caesar that since there are either an infi nite number (if time is continuous) or a very large fi nite number (if time is discrete) of locations in the four-dimensional block that are in the objective past, and only one instant that is in the objective present, that he and Caesar ought to think it far more probable that each of them is in the objective past (Bourne 2002 ;Braddon-Mitchell 2004 ;Merricks 2006 ).…”

Section: Epistemic Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block

Miller

2013

A Companion to the Philosophy of Time

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Presentism, eternalism, and growing-blockism are theories or models of what the temporal and ontic structure of the world is, or could be. i shall set aside the question of whether whichever theory is true is necessarily true or only contingently true. since defenders of each of these views at the very least think that they are competing views about the way our world is in fact, i focus discussion on this aspect of the dialectic.Presentism, eternalism, and growing-blockism are, in part, theories about what exists. "Exists" is used in ordinary English in a number of ways. To understand what is at issue between these three views we need to understand what each view intends when it makes claims about what exists. suppose i stand in my kitchen and utter the following three claims:A. There is no santa Claus. B. There is no beer. C. There are no dinosaurs.When i utter (B) in my kitchen, what i say is true. That is because it is natural to understand me as claiming that there is no beer in my kitchen. since there is beer at the local shop, the claim that there is no beer at all anywhere is false. That is, the claim "there is no beer" is false if we do not relativize the claim to some particular domain, like my kitchen, in which there is no beer.When i utter (A) this is also true. 1 But a natural reading of my utterance of (A) in my kitchen is not that that there is no santa Claus in my kitchen, though that is true, but that there is no santa Claus anywhere: no santa simpliciter, as we put it. The difference between (A) and (B) is that a natural reading of (B) tacitly restricts the domain 21 A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, First Edition. Edited by Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon.

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Section: Epistemic Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block

Miller

2013

A Companion to the Philosophy of Time

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“…For a slightly different view, seeTallant (2014). 6 The problem was introduced -independently -byBradon-Mitchell (2004) andBourne (2002). For a recent defence of the problem, seeTallant (2011).…”

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confidence: 99%

Presentism, Truthmaking and Necessary Connections

Tallant

2014

Theoria

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Abstract:Ross Cameron puts forward a novel solution to the truthmaker problem facing presentism (sect. 1). I claim that, by Cameron's own lights (explained in sect. 2), the view is not in fact a presentist view at all, but rather requires us to endorse a form of Priority Presentism, whereby past objects are derivative and depend for their existence upon present objects. I argue (sect. 3 and 4) that this view should be rejected.

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“…Rather, such claims are supposed to explicate supertime talk in terms of primitive tense.15 There is now a small literature on this 'how do I know that it is now now?' objection, originally pressed byBourne (2002) andBraddon-Mitchell (2004).…”

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confidence: 99%

XVI-Relativity, the Open Future, and the Passage of Time

Pooley

2013

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)

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Is the objective passage of time compatible with relativistic physics? There are two easy routes to an affirmative answer: (1) provide a deflationary analysis of passage compatible with the block universe, or (2) argue that a privileged global present is compatible with relativity. (1) does not take passage seriously. (2) does not take relativity seriously. This paper is concerned with the viability of views that seek to take both passage and relativity seriously. The investigation proceeds by considering how traditional A‐theoretic conceptions of passage might be generalized to relativistic space‐times without incorporating a privileged global present. I argue that the most promising position marries the idea that open possibilities for the future are settled as time passes with a ‘non‐standard’ interpretation of the relevant formal models.

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How do we know it is now now?

Cited by 46 publications

References 6 publications

Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block

Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block

Presentism, Truthmaking and Necessary Connections

XVI-Relativity, the Open Future, and the Passage of Time

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