How Does Corruption Affect the Adoption of Lobby Registers? A Comparative Analysis

Abstract

Recent research has demonstrated that some governments in developed democracies followed the OECD and the EU recommendations to enhance transparency by adopting lobby registers, whereas other countries refrained from such measures. We contribute to the literature in demonstrating how corruption is linked to the adoption of lobbying regulations. Specifically, we argue that governments regulate lobbying when they face the combination of low to moderate levels of corruption and a relatively well-developed economy. To assess this argument empirically, we compare 42 developed countries between 2000 and 2015, using multivariate logistic regressions and two illustrative case studies. The statistical analysis supports our argument, even if we include a number of control variables, such as the presence of a second parliamentary chamber, the age of democracy, and a spatial lag. The case studies illustrate the link between anti-corruption agenda and the adoption of lobby registers.

Lopsided lobbying? Regulatory opportunism and the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying

“…Others have challenged whether scandals and, broadly, corruption are sufficient conditions for regulatory change (Campos and Giovannoni 2007;Crepaz 2017;De Francesco and Trein 2020). Crepaz (2017) submits that international norms of anti-corruption have been effective in pressing states to implement legislation.…”

“…There is a widely shared and founded anxiety over the inequities within interest group influence in policy provision. This "weak state" fear has raised demand among developed states for lobbying regulations to prevent corruption and survey habits of state access (Chari, Murphy and Hogan 2007;Murphy 2017;De Francesco and Trein 2020). Countries with a high degree of distrust of government, like the United States, have been pioneers of lobbying regulatory frameworks (Flavin 2015).…”

The enactment of public participation in rulemaking: A comparative analysis

“…Ultimately, procedural requirements of openness and consultation in rulemaking complement other good governance rules, such as access to government documents (Berliner, 2014), lobby registers (Crepaz, 2017;De Francesco & Trein, 2020), and impact assessments (De Francesco, 2012;Hironaka, 2002). Together, these form an ecology of institutions (Damonte et al, 2014;Dunlop et al, 2020) and a more adversarial style of rulemaking that is characterized by highly detailed and transparent administrative procedures (Kagan, 1997(Kagan, , 2007Kelemen, 2006Kelemen, , 2012Kelemen & Sibbitt, 2004).…”

Explaining the German lobbying register law and its reform: combining insights from the Multiple Streams Framework and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

“…The US has a robust system, while the EU and Canada have a medium level of regulation. In the last decade, a new wave of stricter lobbying regulation in Europe has seen reforms in several countries (Holman and Luneburg 2012;Greenwood and Dreger 2013), with different dynamics in regulated states, such as the EU (interinstitutional transparency register of 2021), Austria, France, Greece (since 2021), Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg (since 2022), Poland, Slovenia, and the UK, limited regulation in Belgium, the Netherlands and Romania, and unregulated states, such as the Scandinavian countries as well as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain (Crepaz et al 2019;De Francesco and Trein 2020;Vargovčíková 2017;Korkea-aho 2021). Recent activities are seen in Finland and Cyprus which adopted a lobbying register starting in 2024 (for a recent overview see Kergueno 2024).…”

“…Scandals therefore have an indirect impact on the policymaking process (see also Burkhardt 2018), and only in combination with other factors lead to stricter laws. These driving factors include, for example, the pursuit of public trust (Holman and Luneburg 2012;Crepaz and Chari 2014;Keeling et al 2017) accompanied by 'symbolic politics' (Vargovčíková 2017) and corruption perception (De Francesco and Trein 2020). Other dynamics include policy diffusion and learning in the context of a 'new wave of strong lobbying regulation' (Holman and Luneburg 2012;De Francesco 2021) following the EU's example.…”