How Does Public Participation in Environmental
Protection Affect Air Pollution in China?
A Perspective of Local Government Intervention

Han, Ying; Kou, Po; Jiao, Yang

doi:10.15244/pjoes/141811

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Contrary to common knowledge, some scholars pointed out that the administrative intervention of local governments is not conducive to environmental improvement. Due to the competition of GDP growth between local governments, this adverse impact has a spatial spillover effect (Liu et al, 2021;Han et al, 2022). The analysis results of this study also confirm that there is a negative relationship between environmental governance investment and air quality based on time and space.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 66%

Environmental governance investment and Air Quality: Based on China’s provincial panel data

Zhang

et al. 2022

Front. Environ. Sci.

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Ambient air pollution is an important environmental problem that impacts the health and sustainable development of human beings. Many measures have been taken by governments to decrease air pollution. This paper focuses on whether government investment has a positive effect on air quality. Based on China’s environmental statistics from 2003 to 2020, the Spatiotemporal Weighted Regression Model is used to observe the spatiotemporal correlation between environmental governance investment and air quality in different provinces in China, finding that there is a negative time-space correlation between environmental governance investment and air quality. In addition, environmental governance investment will not immediately improve air quality, and air pollution has the characteristics of spatial overflow that the pollution between regions affect each other. Then, to further research governments how to deal with environmental protection, configuration analysis has been used, and finds out four high-performance paths for environmental governance of China’s provinces. At the end of this research, we put forward four suggestions for air protection. Firstly, government should formulate long-term air governance policies. Secondly, government environmental governance of air pollution should pay attention to the cooperativity of environmental governance between regions. Thirdly, the third sectors, companies and the public should be encouraged in air protection. Fourthly, government should build a whole-process air governance strategy.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 66%

Environmental governance investment and Air Quality: Based on China’s provincial panel data

Zhang

et al. 2022

Front. Environ. Sci.

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“…Second, in terms of the specific practice of the third-party governance of environmental pollution, Hu (2021) proposes that at the level of institutional improvement, the government's responsibility for the process supervision of environmental governance projects should be clarified, and that at the level of practice promotion, the main position of state-owned enterprises in the third-party governance of environmental pollution should be further clarified. In the face of the risk of third-party governance failure, a more standardized incentive system design is needed (Lv et al, 2019), and thus, a sound and effective incentive mechanism has been established (Han et al, 2020); however, excessive incentives are not conducive to improving governmental regulatory agencies' own performance (Wei et al, 2022), and hence, scholars have proposed formulating and dynamically and progressively implementing a third-party environmental pollution governance fiscal policy, which is conducive to improving the market mechanism of third-party pollution management (Zhou W. J. et al, 2019). In addition, the punishment mechanism is also essential.…”

Section: Gains Of Local Governmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A study on the evolutionary game theory of third-party governance of environmental pollution based on the quasi-co-owned relationship of pollution rights

Hu,

Wang,

Liao

et al. 2024

Front. Environ. Sci.

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The third-party governance of environmental pollution and the pollution rights trading system are two typical examples of modern environmental governance systems. In China, the quasi-co-owned relationship of pollution rights between pollution-discharging and pollution-control enterprises is the link through which to achieve synergy between the two factors. To explore how to achieve such synergy, first, the “principle of no-fault liability” is introduced, and the responsibilities of pollution-discharging enterprises and pollution-control enterprises are defined. Second, based on the quasi-co-owned relationship of pollution rights, a revenue-sharing mechanism for pollution rights trading is designed. Finally, a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of pollution-discharging enterprises, pollution-control enterprises and local governments is constructed, and numerical simulation is performed. The results are as follows. 1) By setting a reasonable market trading price for pollution rights, a reward and punishment distribution coefficient, an improvement in reputation gains, and a saving in pollution rights indicators become conducive to the formation of cooperative relationships between pollution-discharging and pollution-control enterprises, for which the reasonable range of the reward and punishment distribution coefficient is (0.3, 0.4]. 2) Regardless of whether a government subsidy is provided, the optimal range of the revenue-sharing coefficient from pollution rights trading is [0.5, 0.6]. 3) When a government subsidy is withdrawn, increasing the market trading price and surplus indicators of pollution rights can promote the stable operation of the third-party governance model. 4) An increase in policy support and administrative accountability of higher levels of government and a reduction in supervision costs for local governments can help these parties effectively avoid addressing the absence of local government supervision. It is recommended that third-party governance enterprises participate in pollution rights trading to implement the main responsibilities of pollution-discharging and pollution-control enterprises and to set a reasonable revenue-sharing coefficient and reward and punishment distribution coefficient of pollution rights.

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“…Formal environmental regulations have high regulatory costs, and excessive environmental regulations have negative socioeconomic impacts [13][14]. Environmental governance, including regional carbon emission reduction, increasingly needs the power of informal environmental regulation, whose promotion of environmental management has been recognized by many scholars from different countries [15][16][17]. In recent years, environmental organizations and other interested parties have become increasingly involved in local environmental monitoring [18].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Public Participation Reduce Regional Carbon Emissions? A Quasi-Natural Experiment from Environmental Information Disclosure in China

Yang¹,

Zhang²,

Wu³

2023

Pol. J. Environ. Stud.

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Informal environmental regulation, represented by public participation, has an increasingly significant role in environmental governance. This paper utilizes panel data of 285 cities in China from 2003 to 2017. It examines the difference-in-differences (DID) and instrumental variable method (IV) to investigate the causal effect of public participation represented by Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations(ENGOs) on regional carbon emissions. The empirical results show that public participation reduces regional carbon emissions, which still holds after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests. This paper proves an inverted U-shaped nonlinear relationship between the intensity of public participation and regional carbon emissions. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that regional green technology innovation and strengthening formal environmental regulations are the primary mechanisms for public involvement in promoting regional carbon emission reduction. Finally, this paper discusses the heterogeneity governance effect among cities and finds that the governance effect of the sample is more pronounced in eastern cities, non-resource-based cities, large cities, and provincial capitals. The results reveal the importance of public participation in regional carbon emission reduction and provide an empirical basis for promoting informal environmental regulation.

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How Does Public Participation in Environmental Protection Affect Air Pollution in China? A Perspective of Local Government Intervention

Cited by 10 publications

References 21 publications

Environmental governance investment and Air Quality: Based on China’s provincial panel data

Environmental governance investment and Air Quality: Based on China’s provincial panel data

A study on the evolutionary game theory of third-party governance of environmental pollution based on the quasi-co-owned relationship of pollution rights

Does Public Participation Reduce Regional Carbon Emissions? A Quasi-Natural Experiment from Environmental Information Disclosure in China

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