How Does Uncertainty Affect Voters' Preferences?

Christensen, Love

doi:10.1017/s0007123421000247

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…Politicians wish to offer voters certainty yet know they may be rewarded for good policies and punished for bad (Christensen, 2021; Epstein, 1999; Wright and Goldberg, 1985: 3–4). They also know that voters are more sensitive to real and potential losses as opposed to gains (Weaver, 1986), and that electoral reward/punishment is a function of how voters assign responsibility for policy decisions (Kennedy et al, 2021).…”

Section: Theoretical Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Covid-19 Policy Convergence in Response to Knightian Uncertainty

Sayers

Scholtz

Armstrong

et al. 2022

Political Studies Review

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Domestic policy responses to COVID-19 were remarkably consistent during the early days of the pandemic. What explains this policy convergence? Our formal model suggests that the novel character of COVID-19 produced a period of maximum policy uncertainty, incentivizing political actors to converge on a common set of policies to minimize their exposure to electoral punishment. This convergence is likely to break down as policy feedback produces opinion divergence among experts and the public and as politicians recalculate the costs and benefits of various policy responses and under some conditions facing incentives to adopt extreme policies.

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Section: Theoretical Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Covid-19 Policy Convergence in Response to Knightian Uncertainty

Sayers

Scholtz

Armstrong

et al. 2022

Political Studies Review

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“…As the outcomes of political reforms are never fully known, political actors do this in part by providing predictions about the outcomes of policy proposals (e.g. Christensen 2021a; Hirschman 1991; Jacobs and Matthews 2017; Jerit 2009; Morisi 2018; Riker 1996). When political actors decide what predictions to make, they face a trade-off.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Numerous studies examine how motivated reasoning shapes the information processing of voters (e.g. Lodge and Taber 2013;Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979;Redlawsk 2002;Taber and Lodge 2006) or the persuasiveness of predictions (Christensen 2021a;Jacobs and Matthews 2017;Jerit 2009). Yet, few studies explicitly link such biases to the strategic behavior of political actors when shaping public opinion (see, e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Persuasion under Confirmation Bias: Theory and Evidence From a Registered Report

Christensen

2021

J Exp Polit Sci

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Political actors face a trade-off when they try to influence the beliefs of voters about the effects of policy proposals. They want to sway voters maximally, yet voters may discount predictions that are inconsistent with what they already hold to be true. Should political actors moderate or exaggerate their predictions to maximize persuasion? I extend the Bayesian learning model to account for confirmation bias and show that only under strong confirmation bias are predictions far from the priors of voters self-defeating. I use a preregistered survey experiment to determine whether and how voters discount predictions conditional on the distance between their prior beliefs and the predictions. I find that voters assess predictions far from their prior beliefs as less credible and, consequently, update less. The paper has important implications for strategic communication by showing theoretically and empirically that the prior beliefs of voters constrain political actors.

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