How many sciences for one world? Contingency and the success of science

Trizio, Emiliano

doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.017

Cited by 16 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 1 publication

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Even if, despite the monist regime, contingentists are able to identify a promising putup, Soler explains that the inevitabilist holds all of the cards when it comes to evaluating its success. C/I scholars have long struggled with the unenviable task of defining and delineating the three conditions stipulated in P1: genuine science, similar questions, and equal value (e.g., Soler, 2008a;2008b;Trizio, 2008;Kinzel, 2015). Often these exemplary analyses yield more questions than answers.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Against defaultism and towards localism in the contingency/inevitability conversation: Or, why we should shut up about putting-up

Aylward

2019

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Philosophers and historians of science have for some time now debated whether the results of current science are 'contingent' or 'inevitable'. Scholars have noted that inevitabilism often enjoys the status of a presumptive default position. Consequently, contingentists are, from the outset, lumbered with the burden of proof. This is evident in the case of the inevitabilist demand that the contingentist "put up or shut up" (PUSU). This paper adds to the existing case which says that inevitabilism's default-status is unjustified. However, whilst some have suggested that contingentism should replace inevitabilism as the default position, I argue that the contingency/inevitability (C/I) conversation should proceed sans default. This move is motivated largely by my claim that the C/I issue is best conceived as a 'local', rather than a global or universal one. The main problem with taking inevitabilism or contingentism as the default is the globalist nature of such a tack. Whilst localism is arguably an emergent reality of the growing C/I literature, its implications have not been fully realised. I suggest that fully and explicitly embracing localism, including the closely related move of doing away with defaults, represents the most promising way forward for the C/I conversation. In addition, I will show how these moves entail that we stop worrying about the inevitabilist PUSU demand, or more bluntly, that we shut up about putting-up. Keywords contingentism; inevitabilism; "put up or shut up"; defaultism; globalism; localism Joseph Martin's (2013) article, which purports to address a "lingering ambiguity in the way contingency is defined" (919), is one such contribution. In it, Martin proposes a taxonomy of contingency claims, organised according to "the things within science considered to be

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Against defaultism and towards localism in the contingency/inevitability conversation: Or, why we should shut up about putting-up

Aylward

2019

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Even though the dispute between inevitabilism and contingentism appears ultimately undecidable, Léna Soler argues that there is a “strong empirical evidence” in favor of contingentism nonetheless (2015b: 98). She is referring here to the large body of work accumulated under the sociology of scientific knowledge approach that enabled the social scientists to accumulate data in support of what Trizio (2008) later labelled as the “multiplicity thesis,” that is, the view that “there is one world, and any number of different descriptions of it” (Barnes, 1994: 33). For example, Andrew Pickering in his sociological analysis of particle physics Constructing Quarks (1984) argued that despite the fact that the “old” paradigm of particle physics of the 1960s has been eventually superseded by the “new” quarky paradigm in the 1980s, there was nothing “inevitable” or “necessary” about this development as the nonquarky paradigm could have successfully continued to develop so that there would have been a very different, but no less sound physics today (cf.…”

Section: Inevitability Versus Contingencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Inevitability, contingency, and the epistemic significance of time

Benda

2020

Time & Society

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A considerable attention has been given recently to the analysis of the temporal dimension(s) of science and the impact of the changes therein on scientific work. One of the questions that has emerged from the rapidly growing discussion is whether and (if so) how these changes affect not only the general structural aspects of scientific practice but also the very content of scientific knowledge. In this study, I am going to critically examine these epistemological considerations in the available body of work on scientific temporality and argue that while there has been a significant progress in our understanding of the manifold temporal layers of scientific practice, the analysis of their epistemic impact has remained rather limited in certain aspects. In particular, whereas the recent studies of academic time successfully overcome the binary perspective of “fast versus slow” academia, their considerations of the epistemic role of scientific temporality in particular seem nevertheless still couched in similarly binary terms. Against this background, the study explores—in a deliberately speculative fashion—how the available investigations into the temporal structure of science can be progressively utilized and further developed so as to enable an even more complex, nonbinary understanding of the manifold ways in which scientific practice is affected by its temporal conditions. Drawing on the contingentism/inevitabilism debate in the contemporary philosophy of science, as well as on Andrew Pickering’s “mangle” theory of practice, I develop a tentative argument that the temporal structure of scientific work should be perceived as affecting not merely the speed of scientific development—whether negatively or positively—but more importantly also its direction.

show abstract

“…and still believe that, given the starting point of that research program, the introduction of the concept of quark was inevitable." (Trizio, 2008). In some contexts, for example in debates on underdetermination, the mere logical possibility of certain types of alternatives may already be a controversial issue.…”

Section: Progress In the Contingency/inevitability Debate: A Taxonomimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(2000). The issue has since been explored in more detail in a symposium organized by Léna Soler, published in History and Philosophy of Science (Franklin, 2008;Sankey, 2008;Soler, 2008aSoler, , 2008bTrizio, 2008), in a focus section of Isis dedicated to the role of counterfactuals in the history of science (Bowler, 2008;French, 2008;Fuller, 2008;Henry, 2008;Radick, 2008) and at a conference titled Science as it Could Have Been, held in 2009. 2 We can find some further explicit references to the contingency issue (Kidd, 2013, in press;Martin, 2013;Radick, 2003Radick, , 2005 but in general, systematic and conceptually rigorous literature on the problem is rare.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

State of the field: Are the results of science contingent or inevitable?

Kinzel

2015

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

How many sciences for one world? Contingency and the success of science

Cited by 16 publications

References 1 publication

Against defaultism and towards localism in the contingency/inevitability conversation: Or, why we should shut up about putting-up

Against defaultism and towards localism in the contingency/inevitability conversation: Or, why we should shut up about putting-up

Inevitability, contingency, and the epistemic significance of time

State of the field: Are the results of science contingent or inevitable?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About