2015
DOI: 10.1142/s2010007815500190
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How Much Carbon Pricing Is in Countries’ Own Interests? The Critical Role of Co-Benefits

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 88 publications
(56 citation statements)
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“…For example, the NOx Budget Trading Program discussed above caused 35-40 percent decreases in NOx emissions from regulated power plants but essentially no change in CO2 emissions (Deschenes, Greenstone, and Shapiro, 2017). Although local pollution regulation might have small e↵ects on CO2 emissions, CO2 regulation could substantially decrease local pollution emissions because there is no economically viable end-of-pipe abatement technology for CO 2, so fuel switching from coal to gas due to a CO2 tax would decrease local pollutants (Parry, Veung, and Heine, 2015).…”
Section: Carbon Dioxidementioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, the NOx Budget Trading Program discussed above caused 35-40 percent decreases in NOx emissions from regulated power plants but essentially no change in CO2 emissions (Deschenes, Greenstone, and Shapiro, 2017). Although local pollution regulation might have small e↵ects on CO2 emissions, CO2 regulation could substantially decrease local pollution emissions because there is no economically viable end-of-pipe abatement technology for CO 2, so fuel switching from coal to gas due to a CO2 tax would decrease local pollutants (Parry, Veung, and Heine, 2015).…”
Section: Carbon Dioxidementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In recent estimates of the non-climaterelated health benefits of abandoning fossil fuels (e.g. Parry et al 2014;Thompson et al 2014;West et al 2013;Ščasný et al 2015), the effects of uncertainty about the steepness of climate damages (Crost and Traeger 2014) and the potential of multiple abrupt disruptions in the climate system (Cai et al 2016;Lemoine and Traeger 2016) provide ample reasons for raising the carbon price.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Carbon prices reduce many non-climate externalities related to fossil fuel use, chiefly emission of local pollutants that affect heath and agricultural yields (Shindell, 2015;Thompson et al, 2014;West et al, 2013;World Bank, 2014), but also congestion and road damage. The IMF provides country-by-country estimates of the benefits of reducing fossil-fuel carbon emissions (Parry et al, 2015). The non-climate benefits from carbon pricing may be up to several orders or magnitude higher than what is needed to achieve climate objectives, suggesting that non-climate rationales may dominate the decision on the appropriate price level.…”
Section: Setting the Level Of A Carbon Pricementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The first option is to price carbon emissions at a level that is acceptable in a given country context (Jenkins, 2014;Parry et al, 2015), and to use carbon revenues to protect those negatively affected or generate other growth and development benefits (Franks et al, 2015;OECD, 2017). For instance, cash transfers can be used to correct distributional impacts of carbon taxes, and other taxes can be reduced to enhance the efficiency and fairness of the fiscal system (Combet et al, 2010;Metcalf, 2014;Parry and Williams, 2010).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%