How (Not) to Criticise the Welfare State

Abstract

IntroductionFollowing John Rawls's criticism of 'welfare state capitalism' (henceforth WSC), 1 a promising debate about the implications of Rawls's theory for the set-up of socioeconomic institutions has sprung up. This debate focuses mostly on the alternative to WSC proposed by Rawls: a 'property-owning democracy' (henceforth: POD).2 This article assesses Rawls's case against WSC and for POD, from both a normative and a methodological point of view. It points out several flaws in Rawls's critique of WSC, through a focus on an existing variety of welfare state -a Swedish-style universal welfare state (henceforth UWS) -which is relatively successful, both in terms of its normative merits (assessed on the basis of liberal egalitarian principles of social justice) and in terms of institutional stability and capacity for self-perpetuation. UWS is successful in these regards because it guarantees the continuous availability of a large range of essential goods to the vast majority of citizens, largely operating without means-tests in their allocation. Rawls's 'WSC', on the other hand, is modelled on a 'liberal', residual, welfare state which tends to provide only for the most disadvantaged, and largely draws on means-tests in doing so. In analysing this contrast, and drawing out its normative implications, the article identifies a way to achieve a better connection between liberal egalitarian theories of social justice and empirical research on socio-economic regimes in comparative political science: it illustrates that centring the discussion on the merits and shortcomings of the arguably best existing socioeconomic regime yields a sounder basis for developing and assessing proposals for how to go beyond it, where justice requires this. Journal of Applied Philosophy

The Political Theory of Universal Basic Income

“…The task of the political theorist is then to show what specific role UBI can play as part of a broader package, and to ask what makes it instrumental or necessary for positive change. Attesting to the necessity of UBI does not have to come at the expense of supporting the programs without which our societies would be fundamentally unjust (Schemmel 2015). But since UBI would constitute a very large expense, defending the policy begs the question, "What will it replace?"…”

Property-owning democracy, market socialism and workplace democracy

“…One alternative example, which I find promising, would be a principle of limitarianism, which sets limits on minimum and maximum income and wealth (Robeyns, 2017). 4 It is also conceivable, on the other hand, to reject the claim, that the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the basic liberties are threatened by capitalism (O'Neill, 2008;Schemmel, 2015). It is possible to argue, for instance, that the fair value of political liberty can be secured despite a high concentration of capital, by insulating political power from the influence of money.…”

The Union shall promote social justice

“…137–140). However, his objections succeed only if they are targeted, more narrowly, at residual welfare states; Schemmel (2015, pp. 397–403).…”