How Peace Agreements Undermine the Rule of Law in New War Settings

Abstract

This article argues that internationally endorsed peace agreements entrench the restructuring of power relations that take place in ‘new wars’. It characterizes new wars as ‘mutual enterprises’ in which networks of state and nonstate actors engage in violence for economic and/or political gain. The article shows the way in which such networks subvert efforts to implement a rule of law, primarily using the example of Bosnia. It argues that efforts to challenge such networks through transitional justice mechanisms or democratic politics face huge obstacles. It suggests that the role of the international community has been ambiguous, sometimes going with the grain of existing power relations for geo‐political reasons or for stability and sometimes upholding human rights. Only where grass roots actors have directly accessed international justice mechanisms or where local activists have worked with municipalities have there been some openings. The article concludes by suggesting what a ‘new peace’ might involve.

La responsabilidad de proteger y las nuevas guerras: ¿una herramienta frente a los actores violentos no estatales?

“…Esto se complica aún más por el hecho de que, por regla general, precisamente estos actores también forman parte de las negociaciones de paz. Por lo tanto, no es sorprendente que muchos de estos acuerdos de paz -se habla de hasta el 50% en los primeros cinco años -fracasen (Kaldor, 2016). Y cuando perduran, las diferencias entre el estado de guerra y el de paz son a menudo mínimas.…”

Antropoloji̇ni̇n Bariş Operasyonlarinin Başarisina Etki̇si̇: Suri̇ye Anali̇zi̇

“…Ayrıca dış aktörler, ulusal ve yerel grup ve aktörlerle değişen derecede temas ve ilişkiye sahip olabilirler. Kaldor (2013Kaldor ( : 2016 ve Duffield (1998)'ın üzerinde ısrarla vurguladıkları şekilde, 'finansör-finans edilen' ilişkileri, bağımlılık ve yerel gruplar arası rekabet yaratarak, müzakerelerde seçici (dışlayıcı) temsil ve gündeme yol açabilmektedir.…”

“…Kurumsal barış müdahalesinin en riskli yönlerinden biri, demokratik yönetimi empoze etmek adına, dönüşmekte olan veya dönüşmüş yerel elitin güç ilişkilerinin muhatap alınmasıdır. Böyle bir tavır, bu güç ilişkisini siyasi sisteme iyice yerleştirirken, bu süreçte savaş da hala kafalarda yaşanmaya devam edeceğinden, umut ve vaat edilen hukukun üstünlüğünün altının oyulmasına neden olmaktadır (Kaldor, 2016).…”

Navigating Inclusion in Transitions from Conflict: The Formalised Political Unsettlement

“…This led to a ‘restructuring of power relations’ along power‐sharing lines that has been criticised as translating the war into political institutions, rather than resolving it (cf. Kaldor, : 153). The agreement in a sense incorporated a tension between a unitary state based on individual and group equality and ethno‐politically defined mini‐states based on exclusivity.…”

“…The agreement incorporated rather than resolved the opposing war objectives of the ethno‐political contenders for power and of the key international intervenors. Suggestions that the constitutional elements of the deal could have been delayed or separated from the ceasefire (Kaldor, : 153) are unrealistic—getting agreement to a ceasefire required a constitutional deal to be put in place, as the many years of failed agreements and ceasefires illustrate. However, the peace agreement more invisibly included the idea that the territorial and ethnic divisions would be undone over time by robust human rights protections and a right to return, which would gradually build an inclusive shared central state at the expense of divided entities organised around separation and exclusion.…”