How Policy Shapes Competition: Early Railroad Foundings in Massachusetts

Dobbin, Frank; Dowd, Timothy J.

doi:10.2307/2393736

Cited by 253 publications

(186 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

179

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Prior research contributed to our conceptual understanding of the importance of government policy to firm performance and the circumstances in which firms engage in political strategies (Fligstein, 1996;Dobbin & Dowd, 1997;Hillman & Hitt, 1999). For example, scholars have explored how firms reacted to variation in their political environments (e.g., Henisz & Delios, 2001;King & Shaver, 2001), but very few have empirically examined how firms can influence government agency decision making (Hillman & Keim, 1995).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In such industries, government can dramatically influence firm performance and survival via regulatory approvals or disapprovals of product and service offerings, product standards and production requirements, and market entry and exit rules (Sine, Haveman, & Tolbert, 2005;Garcia-Canal & Guillen, 2008). Given the significance of public policy, much of the research on business-government relations has focused on regulatory change, its impact on industries and organizations, and firm efforts to influence policymakers, a concept often called regulatory capture (Hillman & Keim, 1995;Dobbin & Dowd, 1997;Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Lords of the Harvest: Third-Party Influence and Regulatory Approval of Genetically Modified Organisms

Hiatt

Park

2013

AMJ

161

109

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Little is known about the factors that influence regulatory-agency decision making. We posit that regulatory agencies are influenced by the firms they regulate, but not exclusively via dyadic exchanges as is traditionally argued in the regulatory capture and business-government literatures. Instead, regulatory decisions are indirectly shaped via third-party actors who shield agencies from legitimacy threats. Focusing empirically on the U.S. Department of Agriculture's approval of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), we find that product assessments by powerful stakeholders and peer agencies influence product approval and that their effects vary under different threats. We also discuss the implications of these findings for businessgovernment relations, nonmarket strategy, and organization theory.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lords of the Harvest: Third-Party Influence and Regulatory Approval of Genetically Modified Organisms

Hiatt

Park

2013

AMJ

161

109

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…As scholars have shown, the uncertainties or prohibitions associated with new laws, agencies, and mandates can profoundly destabilize existing systems, fueling sustained institutional dynamics (Fligstein 1990;Edelman 1992;Dobbin & Dowd 1997;Hoffman 1999). Finally, outsider groups like ACT UP and Earth First!…”

Section: Movements From Outside Institutions: Challenger/ Dominance Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Movements and Institutional Analysis

Schneiberg¹,

Lounsbury²

2008

The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism

230

160

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Ideally these paths constitute a social optimum considering construction costs and generalized travel costs. However, due to often noncooperative decision-makers (Knick Harley 1982;Dobbin and Dowd 1997;Xie and Levinson 2011), potential transport network expansion outcomes may be limited to Nash equilibria (Bala and Goyal 2000;Anshelevich et al 2003) that can entail considerable extra costs to reach a target state of connectivity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transport link scanner: simulating geographic transport network expansion through individual investments

Jacobs‐Crisioni

Koopmans²

2016

J Geogr Syst

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper introduces a GIS-based model that simulates the geographic expansion of transport networks by several decision-makers with varying objectives. The model progressively adds extensions to a growing network by choosing the most attractive investments from a limited choice set. Attractiveness is defined as a function of variables in which revenue and broader societal benefits may play a role and can be based on empirically underpinned parameters that may differ according to private or public interests. The choice set is selected from an exhaustive set of links and presumably contains those investment options that best meet private operator's objectives by balancing the revenues of additional fare against construction costs. The investment options consist of geographically plausible routes with potential detours. These routes are generated using a fine-meshed regularly latticed network and shortest path finding methods. Additionally, two indicators of the geographic accuracy of the simulated networks are introduced. A historical case study is presented to demonstrate the model's first results. These results show that the modelled networks reproduce relevant results of the historically built network with reasonable accuracy.

show abstract

How Policy Shapes Competition: Early Railroad Foundings in Massachusetts

Cited by 253 publications

References 0 publications

Lords of the Harvest: Third-Party Influence and Regulatory Approval of Genetically Modified Organisms

Lords of the Harvest: Third-Party Influence and Regulatory Approval of Genetically Modified Organisms

Social Movements and Institutional Analysis

Transport link scanner: simulating geographic transport network expansion through individual investments

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About