How Prioritized Is the Strategic Partnership between Brazil and China?

Christensen, Steen Fryba

doi:10.1007/978-1-137-56178-7_4

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Between 2006 and 2019, COSBAN met five times (Central Government of China, 2012; Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, 2015; Financial News of China , 2019; Press Office of the Ministry of Commerce of China, 2006; Xinhua News Agency , 2013a), with the first meeting in 2006, the second in 2012, the third in 2013, the fourth in 2015, and the fifth in 2019. The eight subcommittees held as many as thirty-five meetings: seven for economy and trade ( Financial News of China , 2019), six for agriculture (Press Office of the Ministry of Agriculture of China, 2019), five for industry and IT (Department of International Cooperation, 2017), four for economy and finance ( Xinhua News Agency , 2013b), four for space cooperation (China National Space Administration, 2016), four for science, technology, and innovation (PRC Embassy to Brazil, 2017), four for culture (Press Office of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of China, 2016), and one for energy and mining (Department of Foreign Capital and Overseas Investment, 2019). There is, however, no public revelation of whether the other three subcommittees (Politics, Education, Quality, and Supervision) ever met during this period.…”

Section: Institutionalising Economic Statecraft Towards Brazilmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beijing’s Institutionalised Economic Statecraft Towards Brazil: A Case Study

Zhang¹,

Chen

2021

Journal of Current Chinese Affairs

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This study adopts an institutional approach in the case analysis of China's economic statecraft towards Brazil. In light of institutionalisation theory, it examines the institutional arrangements between Beijing and Brasilia for the purpose of facilitating bilateral economic cooperation and advancing strategic partnership. As a descriptive effort, it yields some preliminary findings: first, the institutionalisation of China's economic statecraft towards Brazil is incremental, driven largely by the desire for and belief in long-term planning; second, a set of norms, values, and principles is instituted alongside designated agencies, point persons, operational protocols, and exchange mechanisms, creating a form of institutional governance based on a multi-actor, multilevel, and network-based steering mode; third, governance remains so centralised that it falls short in empowering strategic participation; and, fourth and finally, Beijing's institution-building proves useful in the management of relations with Brazil, suggesting that economic statecraft may benefit from institutionalisation.

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