How scientific models can explain

Abstract

Scientific models invariably involve some degree of idealization, abstraction, or fictionalization of their target system. Nonetheless, I argue that there are circumstances under which such false models can offer genuine scientific explanations. After reviewing three different proposals in the literature for how models can explain, I shall introduce a more general account of what I call model explanations, which specify the conditions under which models can be counted as explanatory. I shall illustrate this new framework by applying it to the case of Bohr's model of the atom, and conclude by drawing some distinctions between phenomenological models, explanatory models, and fictional models.

Explanatory integration

“…Much recent work on scientific explanation focuses on the role of idealized explanatory models (Woodward 2003;Strevens 2008;Batterman 2010;Bokulich 2011;Batterman and Rice 2014;Healey 2015;Reutlinger 2016;Saatsi 2016). This work has been successful in enriching our understanding of explanation in areas of science where earlier accounts-whether causal or deductivist-are inapplicable.…”

“…I believe this work has largely overlooked or misunderstood the role of global theory in explanation, and the connection between global theory and local model, and it has thereby misconstrued how idealized models underwrite scientific explanation. This section discusses three prominent accounts of model-based explanation: Woodward's causal difference-making account, Batterman and Rice's minimal models account, and Bokulich's structural account (Woodward 2003;Batterman and Rice 2014;Bokulich 2011). Woodward, Batterman and Rice include no role for global theory in their accounts, and they deny that anything like theoretical integration is necessary for explanation.…”

“…Idealized models contain elements that do not accurately represent components of the target system itself. Recent work in philosophy of science has argued that these elements of idealized models may nonetheless be used to explain phenomena or regularities in the target (Woodward 2003;Strevens 2008;Batterman 2010;Bokulich 2011;Batterman and Rice 2014;Healey 2015;Reutlinger 2016;Saatsi 2016;[self-reference omitted]). The goal of this paper is to show how scientific explanation functions in the context of idealized models by articulating certain local and global necessary conditions that the explanation and the models must satisfy.…”

“…Rather, the aspect of explanation most urgently requiring investigation is one neglected by earlier deductivists: the nature of the connection between global theories and explanatory local models. Section 4 reviews prominent causal, minimal model, and structural accounts of model-based explanation (Woodward 2003;Batterman and Rice 2014;Bokulich 2011). It argues that they too fail to offer an account of the connection with global theory that can justify the explanatory power of an idealized local model, and consequently these accounts are unable effectively to distinguish explanatory from non-explanatory models.…”

Causal Relations and Explanatory Strategies in Physics

“…Valuable work has been done by philosophers of physics on the possible explanatory roles of highly idealized models (Rueger 2001;Batterman 2002;Bokulich 2008;Batterman 2010;Bokulich 2011). Alisa Bokulich, for instance, has argued that "fictional models" can be explanatory if they meet certain conditions.…”