How should we define goodness?—reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity

Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Iwasa, Yoh

doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.06.005

Cited by 409 publications

(511 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…This is an important issue, as it allows to investigate the competition of different 'moral systems'. In particular, this approach no longer makes use of the assumption that one player acts as a referee whose public assessment is adopted by all other players (Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004;Pacheco et al, 2006;Panchanathan and Boyd, 2003). It is common-day experience that different people can assess one and the same action in different ways.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A third-order assessment rule takes moreover into account the image of the donor A. A strategy in the indirect reciprocity interaction consists of an assessment rule together with an action rule telling the player which decision to take, as a donor, depending on the image of the recipient and the own image (Brandt and Sigmund, 2004;Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

Uchida¹,

Sigmund

2010

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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Indirect reciprocity is one of the basic mechanisms to sustain mutual cooperation.Beneficial acts are returned, not by the recipient, but by third parties. Indirect reciprocity is based on reputation and status: it pays to provide help because this makes one more likely to receive help in turn. The mechanism depends on knowing the past behavior of other players, and assessing that behavior. There are many different systems of assessing other individuals, which can be interpreted as rudimentary moral systems (i.e. views on what is 'good' or 'bad'). In this paper, we describe the competition of some of the leading assessment rules called SUGDEN and KANDORI by analytic methods. We show that the sterner rule KANDORI has a slight advantage in the sense that KANDORI-players have more chance to earn higher payoff than SUGDEN-players in the presence of unconditional altruists. On the other hand, we see that the unconditional altruists are eliminated in the long run and that stable polymorphisms of KANDORI and SUGDEN can subsist, but that a moral consensus is realized even in those polymorphic states: all players' images are the same in each observer's eyes.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

Uchida¹,

Sigmund

2010

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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“…This explains why evolutionists have analyzed a bewildering number of different models to assess which strategies perform better or coexist in the IPD games and various other games (e.g. [33][34][35][36][37][38]). These models show that genetically determined responses to repeated interactions will often evolve to produce helping behaviors.…”

Section: Opinionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social and individual learning of helping in humans and other species

Lehmann

Foster

Borenstein

et al. 2008

Trends in Ecology & Evolution

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“…In other words, their history of moves is given as public information, whose accessibility is limited only by their memory spans. Moreover, we set aside other public information such as social standing, which is required in Contrite TFT [22,23,24,25] as well as in some form of indirect reciprocity [26,27,28,29,30,31,32]. After deriving our main results under these assumptions, we will revisit the problem of perception error.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat

Baek

Choi

2017

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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One of the most important questions in game theory concerns how mutual cooperation can be achieved and maintained in a social dilemma. In Axelrod's tournaments of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) demonstrated the role of reciprocity in the emergence of cooperation. However, the stability of TFT does not hold in the presence of implementation error, and a TFT population is prone to neutral drift to unconditional cooperation, which eventually invites defectors. We argue that a combination of TFT and anti-TFT (ATFT) overcomes these difficulties in a noisy environment, provided that ATFT is defined as choosing the opposite to the opponent's last move. According to this TFT-ATFT strategy, a player normally uses TFT; turns to ATFT upon recognizing his or her own error; returns to TFT either when mutual cooperation is recovered or when the opponent unilaterally defects twice in a row. The proposed strategy provides simple and deterministic behavioral rules for correcting implementation error in a way that cannot be exploited by the opponent, and suppresses the neutral drift to unconditional cooperation.

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How should we define goodness?—reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity

Cited by 409 publications

References 17 publications

The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

Social and individual learning of helping in humans and other species

Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat

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