How to choose a non-controversial list with k names

Barberà, Salvador; Coelho, Danilo Santa Cruz

doi:10.1007/s00355-007-0268-6

Cited by 58 publications

(74 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…9 Complete: For all x, y ∈ A: x = y implies that ( y x or x y). 10 Barberà and Coelho (2008) also study screening rules, but under a normative perspective. In other studies, procedures that select sets have been analyzed, but then they focus on the problem of selecting a committee of representatives of a fixed size.…”

Section: Screening Rules For K Namesmentioning

confidence: 98%

On the rule of k names

Barberà

Coelho

2010

Games and Economic Behavior

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Section: Screening Rules For K Namesmentioning

confidence: 98%

On the rule of k names

Barberà

Coelho

2010

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…On the other hand, Barberà and Coelho (2008) analyse the stability of some k-rules (based on Copeland, Dodgson, Maximin and Kemeny, among others) and establishes that only Kemeny k-rule always selects a weak Condorcet Committee whenever such set exists.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These extensions are not the only ones Barberà and Coelho (2008). shows other extensions of Copeland and Minmax procedures to k-choice context.…”

mentioning

confidence: 95%

No Show Paradox in Condorcet k-voting Procedures

2010

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In this paper we extend the negative known results about No Show Paradox in Condorcet voting functions and correspondences to the contexts of k-functions and k-correspondences, in which the outcome of the voting process is a unique k-committee (set of k candidates) or a family of k-committees. The main result of the paper states that for every Condorcet k-function and for every Condorcet k-correspondence, there are situations in which every optimistic or pessimistic voter with some specific preferences could manipulate the election by abstaining.

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“…(iii)-the rules based on the Condorcet principle which elect the subset(s) of candidates such that no member is beaten in pairwise comparisons by any outside contender. To have a quick overview of this family of multiwinner voting rules, the reader may refer to the works of Barberà and Coelho (2008), Elkind et al (2011Elkind et al ( , 2015, Fishburn (1981), Gehrlein (1985), Kamwa (2017), Kamwa and Merlin (2018), Kaymak and Sanver (2003), Ratli (2003), among others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…That is the reason why other extensions of this concept have been suggested in the literature. We refer the reader to the works of Barberà and Coelho (2008), Kamwa (2017), Ratli (2003) for more information on these notions.…”

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confidence: 99%