How to distinguish memory representations? A historical and critical journey

Abstract

A memória não é um fenômeno unitário. Mesmo entre o grupo de representações de memória individuais de longo prazo (conhecidas na literatura como memória declarativa), parece haver uma distinção entre dois tipos de memória: memória de eventos experimentados pessoalmente (memória episódica) e memória de fatos ou conhecimentos sobre o mundo (memória semântica). Embora essa distinção pareça muito intuitiva, não é tão claro em qual característica ou conjunto de características inter-relacionadas reside a diferença. Neste artigo, apresento os diferentes critérios propostos na literatura filosófica e científica para dar conta dessa distinção: (1) o veículo de representação; (2) a gramática do verbo “lembrar”; (3) a causa da memória; (4) o conteúdo da memória; e (5) a fenomenologia das representações da memória. Embora alguns critérios pareçam mais plausíveis que outros, mostro que todos são problemáticos e nenhum deles realmente cumpre seu objetivo. Em seguida, descrevo brevemente um critério diferente, o critério afetivo, que parece uma linha de pesquisa promissora para tentar entender os fundamentos dessa distinção.

El viaje mental en el tiempo en la filosofía y la ciencia cognitiva de la memoria

“…La cronestesia se re ere a la conciencia del tiempo subjetivo, mientras que la autonoesis se re ere a la conciencia del yo y sus experiencias a lo largo del tiempo. Aunque la noción de autonoesis no está bien de nida en los escritos de Tulving (Trakas 2019), la distinción apunta a capturar dos aspectos diferentes de la conciencia del yo en el tiempo: mientras que la autonoesis enfatiza la conciencia del yo, la cronestesia enfatiza la conciencia del tiempo subjetivo (Tulving 2002).…”

“…Por ejemplo, a diferencia del TT, que presenta destinos puntuales, los "destinos" del MTT poseen múltiples escalas de tiempo y niveles de especi cidad. Al recordar, a veces viajamos mentalmente a un evento complejo que incluye una sucesión de eventos simples, como "ir al aeropuerto" o "viaje a Malasia"; otras veces el destino es un evento repetido que ha tenido lugar en varios períodos prolongados -pero entrecortados-de tiempo, como "veranos en la playa"; e incluso, otras veces, se trata de un período de la vida, como "la vida en la casa amarilla de La Plata" o la "infancia" (Linton 1986;Barsalou 1988;Conway y Pleydell-Pearce 2000;Trakas 2019;D'Argembeau 2020). Además, los destinos del MTT generalmente no son estables ni puntuales, como los del TT, sino que uctúan desde eventos simples a eventos más complejos y abstractos y viceversa (Neisser 1986;Barsalou 1988;D'Argembeau 2020).…”

No trace beyond their name? Affective Memories, a forgotten concept

“…This phenomenal distinction, as well as the previous distinction based on the content, is ultimately grounded on distinct brain systems (Tulving, 1985(Tulving, , 1999Schacter & Tulving, 1994): the episodic memory system would mainly involve the hippocampus whereas the semantic memory system does not. Nonetheless, what changes in this second way of differentiating the two are the main traits attributed to memory representations resulting from these two systems: episodic memory is characterized by autonoetic awareness and semantic memory by noetic awareness (Tulving, 1985).The concept of noetic and autonoetic awareness, however, are not well defined by Tulving (see Trakas, 2019), but are in general considered as follows: while noesis refers to the conscious experience of simply knowing information concerning a past event, autonoesis also implies the awareness that the past event has been experienced, witnessed or orchestrated by me. Autonoesis is possible because of the human capacity of mental time travel, that is, "to travel back in his or her mind to an earlier occasion or situation in the rememberer's life, and to mentally relive the experienced and thought-about happenings" (Tulving, 2005, p. 14).…”

The Role of Memory Science in the Philosophy of Memory

“…6 6 Trakas (2019) articulates several other ways the scientific literature offers for distinguishing kinds of memory. …”

“…I use it here to pick out the broad range of empirical disciplines where the capacity of retention, in humans as well as other organisms and superorganisms, is studied.3 Asking about remembering rather than memory may strike the reader as curious. It reflects the influence of Martin and Deutscher, who defend their focus on the occurrent state rather than the general capacity as follows: "Since understanding of such a general ability is immediately dependent upon understanding of actual occurrences of remembering, we concentrate our attention on an analysis of the latter" (1966: 165-166).4Werning and Cheng (2017) distinguish 26 distinct objects of the verb 'to remember'.5 Interestingly, memory scientists trace this three-way distinction to the French philosopher Maine de Biran (1804) and his distinction between representative, mechanical, and sensitive memory (seeSchacter et al, 2000).6Trakas (2019) articulates several other ways the scientific literature offers for distinguishing kinds of memory.7The author herself has done this.8 In a recent autobiography of his research, Schacter (2019) characterizes his work in this way.9 It is worth noting that there are still philosophers of memory who defend the causal view. In recent years they have worked to articulate ways that a commitment to the causal condition that finds support from other empirical frameworks(Perrin, 2021;Werning, 2020).…”