How to interpret ‘direct perception’

Snowdon, Paul F.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511554582.004

Cited by 78 publications

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“…Let's now consider what theoretical role for internal representation may remain, given the version of the sensorimotor theory I have advocated. The thesis that perception is wholly or partly constituted by internal representation -call this 'constitutive representationalism' -is featured in the indirect realist view of perception (see, Snowdon 1992) and also in cognitive science as the view, tacit or otherwise, that perception and other cognitive processes depend on internal representation as a matter of conceptual necessity or even definition. The cognitive scientific version is identified and rejected, for instance, by Ramsey (2015) and Noë (2004).…”

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confidence: 99%

Bodily skill and internal representation in sensorimotor perception

Silverman

2017

Phenom Cogn Sci

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The sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience claims that perception is constituted by bodily interaction with the environment, drawing on practical knowledge of the systematic ways that sensory inputs are disposed to change as a result of movement. Despite the theory's associations with enactivism, it is sometimes claimed that the appeal to 'knowledge' means that the theory is committed to giving an essential theoretical role to internal representation, and therefore to a form of orthodox cognitive science. This paper defends the role ascribed to knowledge by the theory, but argues that this knowledge can and should be identified with bodily skill rather than representation. Making the further argument that the notion of 'representation hunger' can be replaced with 'prima facie representation hunger', it concludes that although the theory could optionally be developed scientifically in part by reference to internal representation, it makes a strong and natural fit with anti-representationalist embodied or enactive cognitive science.

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confidence: 99%

Bodily skill and internal representation in sensorimotor perception

Silverman

2017

Phenom Cogn Sci

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“…Also, notice that it's controversial whether we are ever aware at all of qualities in having visual experiences (for useful discussion, see Pautz 2007). For further useful discussion of how to clarify "direct" and "indirect" perception, see Jackson (1977) or Snowdon (1992). 10 Notice that our definition of "immediate justification" allows that other background beliefs might be required for you to so much as entertain the content that p. The crucial focus is on what plays a justificatory role rather than any other role.…”

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confidence: 99%

Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'

Silins

2011

Mind

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Suppose our visual experiences immediately justify some of our beliefs about the external world, that is, justify them in a way that does not rely on our having independent reason to hold any background belief. A key question now arises: which of our beliefs about the external world can be immediately justified by experiences? I address this question in epistemology by doing some philosophy of mind. In particular, I evaluate the proposal that, if your experience E immediately justifies you in believing that P, then (i) E has the content that P, and (ii) E's having the content that P is fixed by what it's like to have E. I start by clarifying this proposal and showing how it can be defended. I then argue against the proposal and develop an alternative. The discussion shows what role visual consciousness plays (and doesn't play) in the justification of perceptual beliefs.

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“…4 In the context of the epistemology of perception and philosophy of mind, the expressions "direct perception" and "immediate perception" are considered equivalent, and "direct" and "immediate" are mainly understood in the sense of "non-inferential". See, for instance, McDermid (2001), Malcom (1953), and Snowdon (1992. In particular, Snowdon (1992) elucidates the notion of direct perception as follows: a subject S directly perceives an object O if and only if S stands, in virtue of her perceptual experience, in such a relation to O that, if S could make demonstrative judgments, then it would be possible for S to make the true demonstrative judgment "That is O".…”

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“…See, for instance, McDermid (2001), Malcom (1953), and Snowdon (1992. In particular, Snowdon (1992) elucidates the notion of direct perception as follows: a subject S directly perceives an object O if and only if S stands, in virtue of her perceptual experience, in such a relation to O that, if S could make demonstrative judgments, then it would be possible for S to make the true demonstrative judgment "That is O". 5 In this paper we will focus on the visual perception of mental states.…”

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confidence: 99%

Perceiving mental states: Co-presence and constitution

Danón

Kalpokas

2017

Filosofia Unisinos

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Recently, several philosophers have called attention to the idea that there are occasions on which we can perceive (at least some) mental states of others. In this paper we consider two recent proposals in this direction: the co-presence thesis (Smith, 2010) and the hybrid model (Krueger and Overgaard, 2012). We will examine the aforementioned alternatives and present some objections to both of them. Then, we will propose a way of integrating both accounts which allows us to avoid such objections. Broadly stated, our idea is that by perceiving other people's behaviors we also perceive their mental states because behaviors co-present some features of the latter, and that this perception of others' minds is direct and immediate because behavior is a constitutive part of the mental states in question.Keywords: mindreading, hybrid model, direct perception of other minds, co-presence thesis. RESUMONos últimos tempos, vários filósofos têm defendido a ideia de que, por vezes, podem-se perceber (pelo menos alguns) estados mentais dos outros. Neste artigo, vamos considerar duas propostas neste sentido: a tese da copresença (Smith, 2010) e o modelo híbrido (Krueger e Overgaard, 2012). Vamos examinar as alternativas mencionadas e apresentar algumas objeções contra eles. Então, vamos propor uma maneira de integrar ambas as explicações que nos permite evitar tais acusações. No geral, a nossa ideia é que, quando percebemos o comportamento dos outros nós também percebemos seus estados mentais, porque os estados mentais são coapresentados no comportamento, e que esta percepção das mentes dos outros é direta e imediata, porque o comportamento é parte integrante dos estados mentais em questão.Palavras-chave: leitura mental, modelo híbrido, a percepção direta de outras mentes , tese de copresença.

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How to interpret ‘direct perception’

Cited by 78 publications

References 0 publications

Bodily skill and internal representation in sensorimotor perception

Bodily skill and internal representation in sensorimotor perception

Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'

Perceiving mental states: Co-presence and constitution

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