How to Keep Officers in the Barracks: Causes, Agents, and Types of Military Coups

Leaving the Barracks: Military Coups in Developing Democracies

“…But because they have access to weapons and exercise direct command over enlisted soldiers, they can sometimes overpower both political incumbents and higher‐ranking officers. (Albrecht and Eibl 2018, 315)…”

“…Military elites tend to come from the ruling parties' families, giving them ties to industry outside of the purview of the military yet giving them political leverage within internal ministries. Albrecht and Eibl (2018, 315) argue that “officers attempt coups d'état when their position within the elite coalition is threatened—whether by a power shift within the ruling coalition or by political liberalization—and when they can coordinate among one another.” These senior officers are able to leverage their position to set the conditions for a coup “because of their position, they may have access to restricted information on the preferences, tactical readiness, and beliefs of other key officers” (Singh 2014, 80). Senior officials access to this crucial information makes coups carried out by military elites the most successful (68 percent success rate) according to Singh (2014).…”

Revolutions and the Military: Endgame Coups, Instability, and Prospects for Democracy

“…This is to accumulate what he calls “soft power,” including the ability to gather information about internal dynamics within the military organization but also about other elite factions of the regime and the interests of foreign powers. Coordination across senior military leaders is particularly useful to overcome an effective coup-proofing measure applied by authoritarian incumbents: institutional counterbalancing (Albrecht & Eibl, 2018).…”

“…Junior officers, by contrast, do not have a stake in political power and perceive military service primarily as professional employment. Since they are the direct superiors of rank-and-file soldiers, their perceptions and interests in the context of popular mass uprisings are also shaped by their subordinates, that is, military personnel who more likely associate themselves with the revolutionary spirit of ordinary people rather than those in the corridors of power (Albrecht & Eibl, 2018). While junior officers and rank-and-file soldiers lack interest in coup attempts, they also do not want to be engaged in the suppression of popular uprisings, at least when they remain peaceful.…”

“…Drawing on our original medium- n data set of endgame coups, we suggest disaggregating specific coup types by distinguishing between different context factors (regular coups vs. endgame coups) and coup agents (senior vs. junior officers). In so doing, this article contributes to a growing research program differentiating between discrete types of coups, for instance, by emphasizing distinct agents within the military apparatus (Albrecht & Eibl, 2018; Bou Nassif, 2015; De Bruin, 2019; Singh, 2014) or the social and ethnic identities of coup plotters (Harkness, 2018; Kandeh, 2004; Roessler, 2011).…”