How to Reject Resultant Moral Luck Alone

Rivera‐López, Eduardo

doi:10.1007/s10790-015-9531-8

Cited by 12 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…4 It is thus thought that we have to give up either the particular moral responsibility judgments or the control principle to solve the problem of moral luck. The most popular strategy is to abandon the particular moral responsibility judgments (e.g., Enoch & Marmor 2007;Herdova & Kearns 2015;Jensen 1984;Khoury 2018;Levy 2011;Lockhart & Lockhart 2018;Nelkin 2019;Peels 2015;Pritchard 2005;Rescher 1993;Richards 1986;Rivera-López 2016;Rosebury 1995;Sverdlik 1988;Thomson 1989;Zimmerman 2002;. Some argue that we should do so entirely, by denying all moral luck, while others argue that we should do so partly, by denying some kinds of moral luck and accepting other kinds.…”

Section: The Problem Of Moral Luckmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Principles: A Challenge for Deniers of Moral Luck

Nyman

2024

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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On a common characterization, moral luck occurs when factors beyond agents’ control affect their moral responsibility. The existence of moral luck is widely contested, however. In this paper, I present a new challenge for deniers of moral luck. It seems that some factors beyond agents’ control—such as moral principles about blame- and praiseworthiness—clearly affect moral responsibility. Thus, moral luck deniers face a dialectical burden that has so far gone unnoticed. They must either point to a relevant difference between factors like moral principles and the kind of factors that according to them do not affect moral responsibility or show how they can avoid having to point to such a difference. I argue that no obvious way to meet the challenge presents itself and that it thus amounts to a serious worry for deniers of moral luck.

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Section: The Problem Of Moral Luckmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Principles: A Challenge for Deniers of Moral Luck

Nyman

2024

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…Some philosophers attempt to solve the contradiction by firmly sticking to the control principle and categorically denying the existence of moral luck (e.g., Levy, 2011;Zimmerman, 1987Zimmerman, , 2002Zimmerman, , 2015. Others try to account for both our adherence to the control principle and the particular judgements by limiting the scope of the control principle and accepting some kinds of moral luck while denying other kinds (e.g., Nelkin, 2019b;Peels, 2015;Rescher, 1990;Richards, 1986;Rivera-López, 2016;Thomson, 1989). But there is also a third solution: to entirely abandon the control principle and accept all kinds of moral luck (e.g., Greco, 1995;Hartman, 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The parallelism argument and the problem of moral luck

Nyman

2021

Philos Stud

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Robert Hartman’s parallelism argument aims to show that resultant moral luck exists. The gist of the argument is this: because there is circumstantial moral luck in a particular circumstantial luck scenario and that scenario is analogous in important ways to a particular resultant luck scenario, the resultant luck scenario is plausibly an instance of resultant moral luck (and hence, resultant moral luck exists). I argue that there is a principled way of denying that circumstantial moral luck is present in the circumstantial luck scenario. Doing so is not enough, however, to reject Hartman’s general analogical line of reasoning since an alternative parallelism argument based on a resultant luck scenario and a circumstantial luck scenario of another kind can be made. Nevertheless, I argue that the analogy between the circumstantial luck scenario and the resultant luck scenario in both the alternative parallelism argument and its original counterpart is too weak to support the claim that resultant moral luck is present in the resultant luck scenario.

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“…The thought that too much moral luck is unacceptable has led some to shrink the locus of our moral responsibility. For example, following the Kantian tradition of the “good will” as the only thing that has moral worth, some have suggested that all that we can be responsible for is mental acts like decisions, or for the character traits issuing in those decisions, given that these are less dependent on external influences and thus less vulnerable to certain forms of luck than other things (see, e.g., Richards , Thomson , Graham , and Rivera‐López ). The literature on the free will problem contains a similar movement in support of shrinking the locus of our responsibility.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Flickers of Freedom and Moral Luck

Sartorio¹

2019

Midwest Stud Philos

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How to Reject Resultant Moral Luck Alone

Cited by 12 publications

References 0 publications

Moral Principles: A Challenge for Deniers of Moral Luck

Moral Principles: A Challenge for Deniers of Moral Luck

The parallelism argument and the problem of moral luck

Flickers of Freedom and Moral Luck

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