How to Think about Nonconceptual Content

Hopp, Walter

doi:10.1558/nyppp.v10i1.1

Cited by 3 publications

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“…Hopp (Hopp, 2010;Hopp, 2011) provides a different argument against McDowell based on Husserl's early theory of fulfillment in Logical Investigations 12 . To put it simply, Husserl thinks thought by itself can be merely empty.…”

Section: Phenomenological Non-conceptualism (1): the Static Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They believe phenomenological reflection reveals everyday forms of sense-making that one cannot appropriately address as conceptualized. Hopp (Hopp, 2010;Hopp, 2011) supports phenomenological non-conceptualism by arguing that McDowell's conceptualism cannot account for what Husserl in Logical Investigations calls "fulfillment". Also, Crane (Crane, 1992;Crane, 2013) claims that cases of perceptual illusion must involve non-conceptual content similar to Husserl's notion of "real content".…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3 For instance: Block (1995;), Bermúdez (1994, Dretske (1995), Tye (1995) and Lycan (2015). 4 Among others: Crane (1992;), Dreyfus (2005, Hopp (2010;), Doyon (2011), Schear (2013, Siewert (2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Phenomenological Approaches to Non-Conceptual Content

Mazijk¹

2017

HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOM

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Over the past years McDowell's conceptualist theory has received mixed phenomenological reviews. Some phenomenologists have claimed that conceptualism involves an over-intellectualization of human experience. Others have drawn on Husserl's work, arguing that Husserl's theory of fulfillment challenges conceptualism and that his notion of "real content" is non-conceptual. Still others, by contrast, hold that Husserl's later phenomenology is in fundamental agreement with McDowell's theory of conceptually informed experience. So who is right? This paper purports to show that phenomenology does not have to choose between any of these positions. Central to the outline I offer is that there are multiple approaches to non-conceptual content in play today. By separating them we can begin to oversee the diversity of phenomenological contributions to the debate about non-conceptual content. I conclude that current literature presents us with at least three sound phenomenological accounts of non-conceptual content, but also that these are generally not incompatible with conceptualism.

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Section: Phenomenological Non-conceptualism (1): the Static Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Phenomenological Approaches to Non-Conceptual Content

Mazijk¹

2017

HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOM

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“…Only at the end of his book does Hopp acknowledge the existence, besides such “epistemic fulfillment,” of the kind of “intuitive fulfillment” that takes place when empty aspects of a perceptual experience become (increasingly) fulfilled in the course of that experience (Ibid., 205–206. But see also Hopp, 2010.). In other words, an “intuitive fulfillment” is not a higher‐level synthesis of distinct signitive and intuitive “acts”, but a one‐level phenomenon of an “act's” transition from lesser to greater degrees of intuitive fullness. We could say that Hopp's view of perceptual content is developed with a regard for his central concern with “epistemic fulfillment,” while mine is based on the idea of “intuitive fulfillment.” However, I am uneasy with this formulation, since I believe that all fulfillment is both intuitive and, at least in a broader sense, epistemic.…”

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confidence: 98%

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confidence: 98%

Perceptual confidence: A Husserlian take

Laasik

2020

European J of Philosophy

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In this paper, I propose a Husserlian account of perceptual confidence, and argue for perceptual confidence by appeal to the self‐justification of perceptual experiences. Perceptual confidence is the intriguing view, recently developed by John Morrison, that there are not just doxastic confidences but also perceptual confidences, that is, confidences as aspect of perceptual experience, enabling us to account, for example, for the increasing confidence with which we experience an approaching human figure, while telling ourselves, as the viewing distance diminishes, “It looks like this just could be Isaac,” “It looks like this is probably Isaac,” “It looks like this is almost certainly Isaac.” I first present my Husserlian account with a focus on the notion of fulfillment, and the idea that the contents of perceptual experience are fulfillment conditions. I then show that this account can be complemented by PC. Finally, I develop a focus on the idea of perceptual self‐justification, diverting the perceptual confidence debate from its pre‐eminent concern with the relations between perceptual and doxastic confidences, and present an argument to the effect that there are perceptual confidences.

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Do We Have To Choose between Conceptualism and Non-Conceptualism?

Mazijk

2015

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

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It is today acknowledged by many that the debate about non-conceptual content is a mess. Over the past decades a vast collection of arguments for non-conceptual content piled up in which a variety of conceptions of what determines a state's content is being used. This resulted in a number of influential attempts to clarify what would make a content non-conceptual, most notably Bermúdez's classic definition, Heck's divide into 'state' and 'content' (non-)conceptualism and Speaks's 'absolute' and 'relative' non-conceptualism. However, these interpretations, I argue, like the majority of non-conceptualist arguments, rest on a misconception of the conceptualist viewpoint. This has brought about an imbalance of the conceptualism/non-conceptualism dichotomy that has not been properly brought into view. This paper proceeds as follows: I first outline the central tenets of the conceptualist doctrine. Subsequently, I show that most of the main arguments of the past decades for non-conceptual content have little to no bearing on conceptualism. Third, I reveal that the definitions of Bermúdez, Heck and Speaks are unsuited to accommodate this asymmetry. Lastly, I claim that only a pluralistic understanding of these debates can reset the balance between conceptualism and non-conceptualism.

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How to Think about Nonconceptual Content

Cited by 3 publications

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Phenomenological Approaches to Non-Conceptual Content

Phenomenological Approaches to Non-Conceptual Content

Perceptual confidence: A Husserlian take

Do We Have To Choose between Conceptualism and Non-Conceptualism?

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