How Worker Participation Affects Reciprocity Under Minimum Remuneration Policies: Experimental Evidence

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe analyze the role of worker participation for the success of minimum remuneration policies. In our experiments employers remunerate workers doing a real-effort task. We vary the way how a minimum remuneration policy is introduced. In the worker-participation treatment, workers bargain with the employer on the enforcement of the policy. In the control treatment the policy is exogenously introduced. We find a pronounced effort increase after the policy was enforced. An exogenous introduction has detrimental effects, i.e., employers frequently pay a premium to maintain performance. Thus, worker participation may be an effective means for maintaining reciprocity under minimum remuneration policies.JEL Classification: C91, J31, J33, M52

How voice shapes reactions to impartial decision-makers: An experiment on participation procedures

“…E.g., in a labor context, Charness et al (2012) document a positive effect of the agents' opportunity to decide about their own wages on their effort provision (see also Köhler et al, 2015). Inversely, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) provide experimental evidence that limiting the choice set of agents may reduce the willingness to provide effort.…”