HPM detector system with frequency identification

Adami, Christian; Braun, C.; Clemens, Peter; Joester, M.; Ruge, Sven; Suhrke, Michael; Schmidt, Hans; Taenzer, Hans-Joachim

doi:10.1109/emceurope.2014.6930892

Cited by 8 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Sabath [22] summarizes a series of criminal uses of high-power EMI tools that result in degradation or loss of the main function of the victim's system, where technical defects, economic losses, and disasters occur. Various defense methods against the high-power EMI attacks have been studied thoroughly in previous studies [1], [2], [4], [11], [14], [18], [19], [28].…”

Section: B Injecting Malicious Signals Into Sensor Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, the attacker must correctly guess the order of the zero and the non-zero samples in every sub-measurement. There are two combinations of the order of samples in a sub-measurement, and the probability of correctly guessing the order is 1 2 . Considering a measurement with n sub-measurements, the probability of correctly guessing the orders in all n sub-measurements is 1 2 n .…”

Section: A Security Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Considering a measurement with n sub-measurements, the probability of correctly guessing the orders in all n sub-measurements is 1 2 n . In other words, the probability of bypassing the detection method in one measurement is 1 2 n , which is negligible. The larger the n is, the more difficult it is for the attacker to achieve the attack.…”

Section: A Security Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

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Detection of Electromagnetic Interference Attacks on Sensor Systems

Zhang

Rasmussen

2020

2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

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Sensor systems are used every time a microcontroller needs to interact with the physical world. They are abundant in home automation, factory control systems, critical infrastructure, transport systems and many, many other things. In a sensor system, a sensor transforms a physical quantity into an analog signal which is sent to an ADC and a microcontroller for digitization and further processing. Once the measurement is in digital form, the microcontroller can execute tasks according to the measurement. Electromagnetic interference (EMI) can affect a measurement as it is transferred to the microcontroller. An attacker can manipulate the sensor output by intentionally inducing EMI in the wire between the sensor and the microcontroller. The nature of the analog channel between the sensor and the microcontroller means that the microcontroller cannot authenticate whether the measurement is from the sensor or the attacker. If the microcontroller includes incorrect measurements in its control decisions, it could have disastrous consequences. We present a novel detection system for these low-level electromagnetic interference attacks. Our system is based on the idea that if the sensor is turned off, the signal read by the microcontroller should be 0V (or some other known value). We use this idea to modulate the sensor output in a way that is unpredictable to the adversary. If the microcontroller detects fluctuations in the sensor output, the attacking signal can be detected. Our proposal works with a minimal amount of extra components and is thus cheap and easy to implement. We present the working mechanism of our detection method and prove the detection guarantee in the context of a strong attacker model. We implement our approach in order to detect adversarial EMI signals, both in a microphone system and a temperature sensor system, and we show that our detection mechanism is both effective and robust.

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Section: B Injecting Malicious Signals Into Sensor Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Security Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Security Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

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Detection of Electromagnetic Interference Attacks on Sensor Systems

Zhang

Rasmussen

2020

2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

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“…Multiple authors indicate the challenge to trace the attackers, e.g. [8]. Possible targets are electronic components from critical infrastructures such as electronics from data centres or even airports [9].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Awareness of the vulnerability of critical infrastructures to IEMI threats: lessons from Austria

Jager¹,

Preinerstorfer²,

Neubauer³

2016

WIT Transactions on the Built Environment

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In recent years, the relevance of electromagnetic threats has increased steadily. In the meanwhile, electromagnetic attacks have been included as one of the novel dangers to critical infrastructures of European societies and beyond. Facing this challenge, the European Commission funded several projects addressing this issue. As one result, the FP7 project HIPOW aims at the development of a holistic regime for critical infrastructure protection against threats posed by electromagnetic radiation in Europe. An examination of policies at different institutional stages issuing the protection against IEMI threats serves as a starting point for evaluating the current protection framework. HIPOW will raise awareness about general vulnerabilities and shortfalls in the design of reallife European critical infrastructure. By making recommendations to policy makers and organisations operating critical infrastructures, HIPOW contributes to the harmonisation of emerging protection frameworks against IEMI threats across Europe. This implies the establishment of a network for operating and supervising protection and preparedness activities to face IEMI threats. Prospective findings will reflect how current protection concepts address identified threats posed by IEMI threats, how overarching strategies are shaping the protection framework and how these strategies may enhance resilience of societies. For that purpose, initiatives intending to increase security will be analysed with regard to their significance for the European security approach.

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“…A number of IEMI detector systems have been developed previously such as those in references [2] and [3] which can detect IEMI. Although reference [4] describes a system that can determine the direction to the IEMI source, we have not been able to find references describing practical systems capable of determining the complete location of the source. In this paper we describe a low cost detection system being developed as part of the STRUCTURES programme.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%