Human Capacities and Moral Status

DiSilvestro, Russell

doi:10.1007/978-90-481-8537-5

Cited by 22 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…This fits with the view of personhood I gestured at earlier: an essential property of one's humanity 6. In this view, a human being is taken to be an Aristotelian substance which instantiates a property of personhood that survives the loss of a subset of abilities necessary only for the expression of personhood.…”

supporting

confidence: 69%

‘Total disability’ and the wrongness of killing

Omelianchuk

2014

J Med Ethics

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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Franklin G Miller recently argued that the wrongness of killing is best explained by the harm that comes to the victim, and that 'total disability' best explains the nature of this harm. Hence, killing patients who are already totally disabled is not wrong. I maintain that their notion of total disability is ambiguous and that they beg the question with respect to whether there are abilities left over that remain relevant for the goods of personhood and human worth. If these goods remain, then something more is lost in death than in 'total disability,' and their explanation of what makes killing wrong comes up short. But if total disability is equivalent with death, then their argument is an interesting one.

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supporting

confidence: 69%

‘Total disability’ and the wrongness of killing

Omelianchuk

2014

J Med Ethics

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“…Esto significa, en grandes rasgos, que no es posible decidir sobre el derecho a la vida de individuos que se encuentran en un coma, ya que el individuo, en el lapso de tiempo en que se encuentra inconsciente, sigue poseyendo el sustrato neuronal que lo capacita para recordar quién era antes del coma y, así, volver a ser la persona que era con anterioridad (8,16). Todo esto sucede con independencia de la continuidad psicológica que se alega que debe ser necesaria y suficiente para que un ser humano pueda calificar como persona y, así, posea un estatuto moral por el que se garantice su derecho a la vida.…”

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Personeidad y coma: una propuesta reversible

Castellano

2022

mye

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La teoría de la persistencia psicológica define a las personas como seres capaces de crear un concepto de sí mismos mediante la continuidad en el tiempo de sus estados mentales. En los debates sobre la vida y la muerte de algunos humanos que han perdido sus facultades conscientes se discute sobre si son personas o no y, por tanto, si sería lícito terminar con sus vidas. El coma se presenta como contraejemplo de las teorías de la personeidad, que justifican el derecho a la vida a partir de la persistencia psicológica del individuo. Este derecho sería otorgado, no en términos de persistencia o continuidad mental, sino por las condiciones que hacen posible su pronta recuperación en el marco clínico de la enfermedad.

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“…DiSilvestro (2010) offers an ingenious alternative view, according to which if we 'can conceivably heal[some] individual this shows that they still have certain capacities, and it's the fact that they have these capacities that gives them moral status'(DiSilvestro 2010: p. 198. My italics).…”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

Sharing in a Common Life: People with Profound and Multiple Learning Difficulties

Vorhaus¹

2016

Res Publica

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There is a view that what we owe to other people is explained by the fact that they are human beings who share in a common human life. There are many ways of construing this explanatory idea, and I explore a few of these here; the aim is to look for constructions that contribute to an understanding of what we owe to people with profound and multiple learning difficulties and disabilities (PMLD). In exploring the idea of sharing in a common life I construe 'sharing' as 'participating in', and 'common life' as the social life characteristic of the environment that someone lives in. My principal purpose is to render the idea of sharing in a common life in terms that help explain its eligibility as a ground for establishing the moral status of people with PMLD. The participatory options I examine each make some call on agency, if only as something hoped for in the future, including when hope flies in the face of expectation. Accordingly I look at conceptions of actual and potential participation in social life, and at the idea of treating people as if they have the potential to participate, even when the existence of any such potential is unlikely. I conclude with some thoughts on the relation between participation and the moral status of profoundly disabled people, and about how much, and how little, the argument has achieved.

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Human Capacities and Moral Status

Cited by 22 publications

References 1 publication

‘Total disability’ and the wrongness of killing

‘Total disability’ and the wrongness of killing

Personeidad y coma: una propuesta reversible

Sharing in a Common Life: People with Profound and Multiple Learning Difficulties

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